

# The Idea of Europe: Continuity and Change

Seminar arranged by the European Cultural Foundation  
Network Finland  
19–20 April 2007

*Collection of speeches*



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Editors: *Sari Aalto*  
*Saara Vibko*  
Photos: *Jussi Aalto*  
except pages 14, 25, 26, 54, 55, 59, 63, 71, 74 *Sari Aalto*  
Layout: *Sanna Skants*

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## Foreword

After 50 years, the basic ideas of the Treaty of Rome continue to be valid: peace and prosperity in Europe through economic integration. Now, following the big steps taken after the cold war, the integration process is looking for new stimuli and vision.

The future of integration is conditional on the awareness of European citizens. Appreciation of the European dimension in EU countries needs to be fostered through open dialogue on the challenges of the EU – its governance after enlargement and the competitiveness of the European societies in the globalizing world.

With this publication, containing the speeches of the seminar "The Idea of Europe: Continuity and Change" held in Helsinki, April 19–20, 2007, we aim to promote discourse on European issues, European identity and culture as well as political and economic aspects, emphasizing unity in diversity according to the mandate of our association. Prominent Europeans from polity and media coming from different parts of the EU consider how we Europeans can build on our heritage when facing the challenges.

Finally, on behalf of our association, I would like to thank the speakers, chairpersons and secretaries, members of the planning group and other key persons for the arrangements as well as sponsors, not to forget the active audience for the success of our seminar beyond all our expectations. Special thanks go to Ms Sari Aalto and Ms Jasmin Etelämäki who took care of practical arrangements with extraordinary commitment. Ms Aalto and Ms Saara Vihko edited this publication.

Helsinki, February, 2008

Sinikka Salo  
Chairman  
European Cultural Foundation Network Finland

# Contents

<b>Foreword</b>	3
<i>Sinikka Salo</i> , Chairman of the European Cultural Foundation Network Finland	
<b>Welcome address</b>	7
<i>Sinikka Salo</i> , Chairman of the European Cultural Foundation Network Finland	
<b>Spirit of Europe</b>	
<b>Spirit of Europe. A view from Poland</b>	13
<i>Leszek Jesień</i> , Head of the European Integration Chair, Tischner European University in Kraków, Polish Institute of International Affairs, Warsaw	
<b>The Carnival and the publisher. Fables in Europe 2007</b>	23
<i>Pedro Sorela</i> , Novelist	
<b>The stories of Europe</b>	29
<i>Agnes Heller</i> , Hannah Arendt Professor of Philosophy and Political Science	
<b>The elusive quest for Europe</b>	41
<i>Alexandre Mirlesse</i> , Associate Researcher, Notre Europe	
<b>Future of the EU – Governance of Unity and Diversity</b>	
<i>Paavo Lipponen</i> , Former Speaker of the Parliament	53
<i>Christoph Bertram</i> , Former Director of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP)	59
<i>Jean-Jacques Subrenat</i> , Ambassador and Chairman of the advisory board, Institut Pierre Werner, Luxembourg	63
<i>Hans von Ploetz</i> , Ambassador and Former Secretary of State	71

## **New Media and Culture: Crossing Borders and Understanding Diversity**

<b>One website, 50 countries and five languages</b>	<b>81</b>
<i>Nicola Mullenger</i> , Communications, LabforCulture	
<b>Redefinition as an identity</b>	<b>85</b>
<i>Umayya Abu-Hanna</i> , Cultural Diversity Coordinator, Finnish National Gallery	
<b>Understanding diversity and creating a European public sphere</b>	<b>89</b>
<i>John Lambert</i> , Editor-in-Chief, signandsight.com	

## **Media and the Future of the European Integration – Developing a Truly European Forum**

<i>Susanne Mundschenk</i> , Co-founder of <a href="http://www.eurointelligence.com">www.eurointelligence.com</a>	<b>97</b>
<i>Jean-Louis Arnaud</i> , Journalist, Novelist	<b>101</b>
<i>Reetta Meriläinen</i> , Editor-in-Chief, Helsingin Sanomat	<b>105</b>

## **Challenges for the EU**

<i>Paula Lehtomäki</i> , Minister of the Environment and former Minister for European Affairs	<b>111</b>
<i>Christian de Boissieu</i> , President of the French Council of Economic Analysis	<b>117</b>
<i>Kersti Kaljulaid</i> , Member of the European Court of Auditors	<b>125</b>

## **Speakers of the seminar** **131**



## Welcome address

*Sinikka Salo*

Chairman of the European Cultural Foundation Network Finland

Distinguished Former Speaker of the Parliament, Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen!

It is my great pleasure, on behalf of the Finnish National Committee of the European Cultural Foundation<sup>1</sup>, to welcome you all to this seminar.

Ever since its establishment in 1969, the Finnish National Committee has actively promoted discourse on Western European issues. In the early days of our association, the political environment in Europe was such that membership in the EU was not a feasible goal for Finland – at least not openly. The vision of a European Cultural Foundation, "If we can't integrate politically, let us join culturally", was on the mark. Since then, the progress of European political integration has not diminished the cultural dimension in any way. If anything, it is more vital for Europe than ever.

Our association was one of the circles fostering the European spirit in Finland – ties to the Western Europe – during the cold war period, and in its own fashion, was paving the way for Finland's membership in the European Union.

The basic ideas of the Treaty of Rome, now celebrating its 50th anniversary, continue to be valid: peace and prosperity in Europe through economic integration. I was moved by a recent speech given by the Prime Minister of Slovenia, Mr Janez Janà, on the occasion of the adoption of the euro in Slovenia at the beginning of this year. He explicitly thanked the Founding Fathers of the EU for having created the idea and embryo of a united Europe, so that his country had a clear goal where to go when they finally were free from the totalitarian regime.

Indeed, we in the EU of today have to be reminded of this point every now and then, when we feel frustrated by the slow progress or apparent stagnation of the integration and reform processes in Europe. Avoiding complacency, we could and should appreciate the immense progress which European integration has made in the past 15–20

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<sup>1</sup> Finnish National Committee of the European Cultural Foundation changed its name to European Cultural Foundation Network Finland in the summer 2007. In Finnish the association is still called Euroopan Kulttuurisäätiön Suomen Osasto.

years. We tend to forget that since the Maastricht Treaty Europe has experienced the single market, the single currency, and two stages of enlargement. No wonder that after these big steps, taken since the cold war, the integration process is currently looking for new stimuli and vision – and thereby for the political will of Europeans.

The future of integration is conditional on the awareness of European citizens. This is the motivation for our seminar "The Idea of Europe: Continuity and Change". We want to look at the integration process from a longer perspective, and therefore we have invited prominent Europeans to the seminar who see the perspectives to both the past and to the future. What, for them, is the European spirit?

We need open dialogue on the challenges of the EU – its governance after enlargement, and the competitiveness of European societies in the globalizing world. How can Europeans unite their forces to be more innovative, say, in the spirit of the Lisbon agenda? In the post-industrial and globalizing world, Europeans need to build their success on their rich cultural heritage, and on the stability of their societies, when facing challenges for the future. Maybe even more than ever before, the future of the EU lies in European culture, in its wealth and unity in diversity. By bringing these issues to the forefront, the Finnish National Committee also seeks to fulfill its mandate to foster appreciation of the European dimension in Finnish Society.

Hence, it is my great pleasure to open this seminar on "The Idea of Europe: Continuity and Change". May the seminar during these one and a half days provide a forum for sincere and open discussions about European identity and culture, its institutions and its governance, facing the challenges for the future, while also focusing on the roles of media and polity in leading the European transformation.

Once again you are warmly welcome!



*Sinikka Salo*







## **Spirit of Europe**

### **Spirit of Europe. A view from Poland**

*Leszek Jesień*, Head of the European Integration Chair,  
Tischner European University in Kraków,  
Polish Institute of International Affairs, Warsaw

### **The Carnival and the publisher. Fables in Europe 2007**

*Pedro Sorela*, Novelist

### **The stories of Europe**

*Agnes Heller*, Hannah Arendt Professor of Philosophy  
and Political Science

### **The elusive quest for Europe**

*Alexandre Mirlisse*, Associate Researcher, Notre Europe



## **Spirit of Europe. A view from Poland**

*Leszek Jesień*

Head of the European Integration Chair, Tischner European University  
in Kraków, Polish Institute of International Affairs, Warsaw

We are facing a period when the most important future shaping events are taking place. We witness the shaping of Europe anew. We are all grateful to the founding fathers for the beginning, the period of 1950s when the basis for future development of European integration was laid down. Now, in 2004, there was a new beginning of Europe. It enlarged to 25 members. Soon after, in January 2007 with accession of Romania and Bulgaria, we could see yet another proof of aliveness of Europe. Historic enlargement has happened.

The integrated European world will probably look somewhat different from what we are used to. There is more diversity, there is more people, there are more governments, there are more cultures and points of view. Internally, the European Union is now undergoing a period of consolidation. We do not know how long it will last. Yet, it seems quite obvious that the things done in the EU 15 cannot be the same in the EU 27. People, politicians, commentators, journalists, we all need to adapt to the new situation and change. Also the EU structures function slightly differently. It is not that their nature changes, but their rhythm of functioning and ability to deliver.

In order to improve functioning of the European Union in connection with enlargement, a number of institutional improvements were introduced in the Amsterdam treaty, the Nice treaty and more recently in the Constitutional treaty that has evolved into the Reform treaty. Yet, it is not only through institutional change that we could analyse the scope of consolidation confronting the EU today. An important basis for the general EU functioning is a broad notion of the spirit of Europe. One, that seems necessary for proper functioning of common institutions. Let us proceed in two steps. The first will be few introductory remarks on possible understanding of the spirit of Europe, while the second will be few notes on how it can be seen from a Polish perspective.

### **Spirit of Europe**

What could be the spirit of Europe? What makes Europe? We will not deal with the broader, civilisation meanings of these questions. We have to observe, however, an obvious fact: Europe is not the same as the European Union. Yet, at the same time there is a tendency to think that the European Union is an expression of "Europe", that it is an expression of what is European in Europe. Therefore, for proper understanding of the contemporary European world, the European Union is essential. A proper un-



*Leszek Jesień*

Understanding of the European Union would help us to see what we are in Europe, and what Europe is as such.

While looking at the European Union, we have to look at its core. There are, of course varying understandings of what constitutes the core of the European Union: institutions, member states, citizens, economy, politics, policies, etc. For simplification of arguments, let us assume that the core of the European Union, the core of importance in understanding "Europe", are its member states, institutions and people.

Certainly cooperation between the member states of the EU is a substantial part of its core. Without this cooperation, there would not be any progress in integration. It was started and it continued to develop via series of bargains, contracts formulated in the treaty form. This process started just after the Second World War and led to creation of the European Coal and Steel Community and – later – the European Economic Community together with the Euratom. Today it constitutes a primary tool in solving conflicts of interests and other problematic issues that may arise among participating member states. This simple but intense cooperation between EU member states, which begun as an attempt to avoid repetition of centuries of wars in Europe, arises today to what is sometimes called "trans-governmentalism": an intense setting for governments' contacts that transcends the normal international cooperation between states. Any regular cooperation between states does not bring new qualities: it is a traditional way of maintaining the international relations. However, in Europe, the cooperation between nation states reached a new level thus creating a new phenomenon that is indeed a dense fabric of trans-governmentalism. This is where we can trace first reasons for speaking about the spirit of Europe.

The second layer of the European spirit is that we do; the integration via help and support of European institutions. Without European institutions, the trans-governmentalism might not exist: there would be no structure to support and enhance the governmental contacts. That is why we are greatly indebted to the founding fathers of European integration. It is thanks to the imagination of Jean Monnet, Altiero Spinelli and others, that we deal today, with inventions of the European Commission, the Eu-

ropean Parliament, and the European Court of Justice that brought us the new meaning of law for the whole Europe. A particular role falls on the Council – it provides immediate framework for governmental cooperation. Thanks to them and these institutions, relationships between the EU member states are institutionalised. This brings us back to the European spirit. The trans-governmental cooperation is built into the institutions and exists between the nation states themselves. Sometimes, this combination of member states' intensive cooperation and the European Union institutions is called a community spirit. Its most advanced application is the co-decision procedure where the Parliament and the Council act together as equals in adopting laws.

Now we need a third observation that would arise to a third layer of the spirit of Europe, that is the notion of political community. Without it, the above outlined elements of trans-governmentalism and institutions – although fully true – may be only a static description of the situation in the European Union today, in Europe as such. Without this additional layer of political community it would lose touch with reality. This additional layer arises to building up of a community, to participation in what is called political community, meaning European political community. Political community in Europe is a fragile and perhaps evasive idea, it is a new phenomenon. As such, it needs to be protected and taken care of. It needs to be underlined, that most probably, without the intense cooperation between the member states, institutionalised by the Commission, the Council, the Parliament, and the Court of Justice, it may not be possible to build any political community in Europe. It calls for knitting of the fabric of Europe, for building it up: it needs to intensify connections between member states, and it needs to bridge all of us, citizens, in order to allow people to deal with contemporary necessities of political life: jobs, stability, security, globalisation, and so on. An important factor in its evolution was in 1979 when the citizens for the first time directly elected the European Parliament. Yet, in fact, this is a double layered community. The European political community is comprised not only of citizens, as we normally use the term for any political community, be it Polish or Finnish, or any other. In Europe, the political community is double-layered in this sense. It has to comprise both the citizens and the member states. It is then composed also of these founding blocks of the European integration: the nation states. These two together comprise the path of building the European community.

Following on from that background, we need to ponder about what is Europe. What Europe means and for whom? There are important differences in the meaning of Europe, important for the course of European integration and therefore for the future of the European Union. Perhaps, Helsinki is as good a place to think about it as Warsaw, because both places are peripheral within the EU. The most traditional understanding of Europe via its most modern emanation of the European Union, is that it is a combination of two factors: the West and the Second World War. The traditional European Union which emerged ever since the founding six countries combined their efforts

together was built on these two most important paradigms.

Europe, the European Union, was in fact the West only, or the Western Europe to the best. Conversely it was Western Europe that was considered to be "the Europe". The whole discussion of how Europe was perceived and how Europe was monopolised by only the Western meaning of it, is nicely described by Norman Davis, a British historian, in *Europe. A history*. On the first dozens of pages we can read a review of various historical readings of Europe, as being only the Western part of it. Now we can see that the whole history of European integration as well, is built on this understanding of Europe as being only the Western part of it. For the sake of discussion of the European integration process, we need to recall that the Communism in Eastern part of Europe clearly helped and contributed to this narrowing down of meanings. The Eastern part of Europe could not be "European" enough to participate in the process of integration. This was not only the case of the so called "Communist block" countries, including Poland, but also those that were perceived to be in the USSR shadow, like Finland. After all, it was only in the mid-1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union that Finland joined the EU together with similarly perceived countries of Austria and Sweden. Seen from that perspective, the enlargements of 2004 and 2007 are a simple continuation of the 1995 enlargement and clearly contribute to a redefinition of not only the European Union as such, but also Europe.

Furthermore, it seems most important that the original understanding of the European Union, and hence of Europe, was built rightly and understandably so, on the meaning of what happened in the Second World War. The War was a defining moment or a springboard for European integration. It was a point of orientation, and provided a point of reference for those people and nations that constructed the first steps of the European integration. Perhaps its most important assumption was the idea of war responsibility of the nation state that prevailed in the years immediately after the Second World War.

Yet, on our – Eastern – side of the story it were the communist times that provided us with a point of orientation and a reference point for understanding responsibilities of the state and the international environment. Here, we in Poland, differ not only from the traditional European=Western perspective, but also from the Finnish one. For countries that lived for years under the communist regime developed a different picture of what happened just after the Second World War. For them, it was a time of oppression, of foreign and externally imposed regime that deprived us of our personal liberties and economic freedom. For Central and Eastern Europe, it was as late as year 1989, that brought them essential freedoms and liberties. The countries of the region oriented themselves immediately towards the European Union and NATO. Hence, in short, they opted for European integration not because the War ended, but because the communism ended. Their point of reference is different. Today, after enlargements

of 2004 and 2007, we all have – therefore – a task in front of us. How to bridge these two understandings, these two meanings of Europe, the Western and Eastern and central, how to reconcile them? On these differing understandings, how to elaborate a single entity that may serve as a political community for all of us? One could be quite optimistic on that, because Europe was always constructed as an idea. It was an idea built on dichotomy, on clashes and contradictions. Here then, in differing points of departure for East and West we see another element from which Europe can be evolving, can be debated and therefore can be built forwards.

<b>Turnout</b>	58,85%	
	Yes (in%)	No (in%)
	77,45%	22,55%
<b>Cities</b>	82,80	17,20
<b>Rural areas</b>	65,76	34,24

*Accession referendum results in Poland, 2003*

### A view from Poland

Of course, massive majority of the Polish population considers themselves European. It is widely therefore understood that Europe is not only the Western part of it. Europe is also the Central Europe and Eastern Europe. This is the only Europe that can be conceived of it, from a Polish perspective, the only reasonable approach. It can be seen at the time of accession referendum in 2003 when a strong majority of Poles voted in favour of Poland's membership in the European Union. This was at the time of lowest ever approval ratings for EU membership due to the prolonged, however necessary, period of accession negotiations that naturally opposed the two sides against each other, thus contributing to a conflicting image of the European Union.

Since the accession in 2004, the public opinion support steadily grows, regardless of changes on the political scene and the effects of elections of 2005 and 2007. As of the end of 2007, it reaches the high levels of 86 percent of population being favourable and satisfied with Poland's membership in the European Union.

A particular and slightly different understanding of Europe, than perhaps in most countries of original founders, sees the European Union through its successes. The ability of the European Union to provide prosperity and soft security for the citizens and NATO having won the Cold War, clearly contributed in Eastern part of the continent, especially under the communist times, to the building of a strong myth of successful Europe.

Yet, the Polish experience with voluntary integration, tolerance and understanding of ethnic variety as constitutive parts of a political community, is not at all new, and does not start only in 1989 with the European integration. It is actually very old and makes for quite a strong political tradition in the country. In order to understand it, we will make a short journey into the past. The Polish understanding of Europe as a political community has two different traditions. The first tradition stems from what has been called "the Commonwealth of both nations", namely the Polish and the Lithuanian. The second tradition is the one of a homogeneous nation state.



*The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth at its greatest extent. Source: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Rzeczpospolita.png>*

The first tradition started in 1569 with an act of the union signed in the Polish town of Lublin between two states and is a great history of combination of two countries, Poland and Lithuania, into one single entity the "Commonwealth of both nations". It lasted peacefully for about two hundred years. The yellow part of the picture is what we used to call the "Crown", the Polish part of it. The pink part of the picture is the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The combined federal entity, almost a new state, had a single crown, single foreign and security policies – to bring here the Euro jargon of today

– and one parliament. But there were two separate armies and two judiciary systems, for example. This was an experience of both Poland and Lithuania on how to build a federal entity on the basis of established entities. In the past, long time ago, both nations went through this experiment happily. It did not collapse because of any internal pressures. In the end, it was weak enough to be partitioned by force of neighbouring powers: Austria, Germany (or rather Prussia) and Russia. This experience remained strong in the imaginative history of the political community of the Poles.




Source: <http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Image:RzeczpospolitaII.png>

## Ethnic distribution of the second republic of Poland in 1931, 32 mln inhabitants total

Poland in 1931, total inhabitants: 32 mln

Poles	65,5
Ukrainians	16,0
Jewish	9,4
Biellarussians	5,5
Germans	2,6
Other	1,0



From: *“Ilustrowany atlas historii Polski. Tom 4. II Rzeczpospolita”* (“*The Illustrated Atlas of Poland’s History. Vol. 4. Second Republic*”), Demart, Warszawa 2007, p. 44-45.

There are several characteristics of the Jagiellonian tradition of the Polish state. It is about multi-ethnic or multi-national entity. It is proud of plurality of cultures – there are many participating cultures to this tradition that is plurally understandable. It also means an open notion of Polishness, open notion of national identity that comes partially from communication with “the other” within the more general political grouping, or political community. It finally builds on and evolves from a tradition of federal structure of the state. It seems interesting that recently in Poland a debate over old time traditions of the state has been renewed. It does, of course, reflect a renewed interest in the East and it weights on the Polish policy towards the East, as a consequence also on Polish preferences as to what kind of policy the EU should have towards the East. It is also interesting to observe – having in mind EU internal debates on enlargement – that this view thinks that the main problem of the Commonwealth was its inability to bring up or enlarge to embrace its third pillar, namely Ukraine.

## Contemporary (2006) demography of Poland, 38,5 mln inhabitants in total

2006

Poles	96,7
Germans	0,4
Biellarussians	0,1
Ukrainians	0,1
Others	2,7



Writer’s calculations based on data from Poland’s Central Statistical Office, “*Demographic Yearbook of Poland 2007*”, accessed: [http://www.stat.gov.pl/gus/45\\_3697\\_ENG\\_HTML.htm](http://www.stat.gov.pl/gus/45_3697_ENG_HTML.htm), also: CIA, *The World Factbook, Poland*, accessed: <http://www.cia.gov/>

The second tradition is one of homogeneous nation state. It was developed in the late 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century among Polish elites, while the country was still partitioned. This was also the time of bringing up of the nation states

in Europe. It could not thrive, however, in the inter-war period because of multiple ethnic composition of the state at that time. Paradoxically, from European integration point of view, after the Second World War, when the Western part of Europe tried the communities experiment, Poland being under the communist regime tested the homogeneous nation state tradition. These were the times, after substantial change of borders in the region that provoked the massive forced migrations. Those were effects of the Soviet purging ethnic experiments initiated by Josef Stalin as well as immediate effects of the Second World War. As a result, the characteristics of the state after 1950 were quite different from what the country experienced previously. A homogeneous Polish state was born. It was more stable domestically, but at the same time any experience of the "other" was clearly weaker. The system tried to close the population behind rigid borders. Freedom to travel was curbed and passports were only granted to those trusted. Practice of the communist regime strengthened effects of homogeneity and weak exposure to the other ethnic experiences.

What I have described above seems to have at least two consequences. The first is that the European Union and Europe as an idea, a general spirit of Europe as sketched before, actually contributes in the case of Poland to a re-birth of tradition of the Commonwealth. However, even if this tradition of a state and its self-understanding is historically strong, it is a little bit different, and for some Poles even alien, from an immediate experience from under the post-Second World War communist regime. The most recent experience is that of the ethnic homogeneous state. There is therefore today a certain tension between those two traditions that can be sometimes observed in current political discourse in the country and in the electoral outcomes.

Currently however, and this note could serve as a final conclusion, we can observe a practical return of the old, historic, Jagiellonian tradition. The wave of migration the country experiences today within the European Union framework, makes hundreds of thousands of Poles migrate voluntarily in search of their dream. They travel to Ireland, Great Britain, Sweden and more recently to Spain, Italy, Denmark and other countries. They seek jobs, look for experiences – the Poles love to travel freely. This is a very simple phenomenon due to a gradual opening of the EU labour markets. On the other hand, it brings pressure to the Polish labour market. Unemployment falls, also because of accelerated economic growth. Demand grows on domestic Polish labour market. The labour market gaps that occur are filled also by migration from traditional directions: Ukraine and Belarus, the immediate neighbours of Poland. We can therefore observe now the emerging of Europe, the spirit of Europe in practice. The spirit of an open and peaceful cooperation, the living together of various entities that Europe is composed of today.



## The Carnival and the publisher. Fables in Europe 2007

Pedro Sorela

Novelist

The first scene of this theatre play takes place in the city of Barranquilla, in the Colombian Caribbean coast, last February. It is night and the streets are filled with men, women, clowns, puppets, acrobats and devils that dance giving themselves to the rhythms that have made this part of the world famous. The salsa dance finds its origins here and so does a big part of the so called "hot music" from the Caribbean: *La música caliente*. It is also the home land of the writer Gabriel García Márquez, who could not be understood without this music that structures and shapes his books and enhances deeply the charm of his work.

Beyond the talent for disguise; beyond the surrealism of the official mask of that carnival – a long and slim trunk of an elephant hanging from a human face with big ears –; beyond the beauty of the black, white and mulato bodies intertwined in sweat, movement and music, what is more attractive of it all – as it is frequent in the Caribbean culture – is the easefulness, the freedom with which all this barranquilleros move. The dance with which they have been raised since they were kids, of course, but, above all, the freedom with which they do it. May it be that this freedom is inherent to any kind of dancing?

However, this is not what really matters, or it is as a sidetrack. What is interesting, in this play, is a covered tribune located just in the center of the Carnival Parade. Here some twenty to thirty people have comfortably taken seat. An equal number of hostesses are catering to them with all kinds of whiskies, food and beverages, treating them as if they were important.

Are they? Well, it depends on how you look at them. They are newspaper editors and columnists; a bunch of film and TV stars, some of them very well known so that many carnival dancers approach them asking for autographs and dance for them; a few characters of the international scene, as Jon Lee Anderson, the author of *The fall of Bagdad* and other books on disaster scenarios, and some writers, professors and musicians, me herein included. I've come to Colombia for the launching of my latest novel and they have been so kind to invite me to this carnival of Culture, which is renowned in the whole continent.

But why are we all a part of this story? It is because, aside from this audience and the hostesses that serve us so kindly whiskies and liquors and typical food, there are some

other men sharing our tribune. In fact, a substantial number of them, an equal number to the rest of us. They also eat and drink with moderation, but nobody knows them nor asks them for autographs. One would say they belong to another gathering.

And so they do: they are bodyguards, responsible for our security. I don't know if anything would happen to us in the event they were not there, but nobody would ever give us the opportunity to find out. There we are, a bunch of journalists, actors and writers looking out to the expression of freedom made dancing, however we cannot mix and mingle with freedom, with the dancers. And the thing is that the very mission of journalists and writers is to mingle, particularly with freedom. Always.

The second act of this theatre play of reality takes place in Palermo, Sicily one month later, it is March. We are now in a cultural center assigned to Europe related subjects. Three intellectuals, me among them, give ourselves to the task, facing a foreseeable scarce audience, of speaking about: "Writing South America", (a very European subject indeed). Until now, as anyone can see, nothing special in the cultural scene, something bucolic and ordinary and almost without interest outside the world of specialists.

Except for two reasons: all of this takes place in a beautiful old church that has become a cultural center serving for the past two years as the studio of a very well known, middle aged European painter. No traces of this artist are in sight, in this very sober and almost naked scenery, except for one detail which grows in importance as the debate goes on: Above what used to be the altar, someone has sketched an upside down goat. And you don't have to be a semiologist or an archaeologist to know that this goat represents the devil, and that this painting is a way the painter is expressing a challenge. Now then, in the 21st century, in Europe, challenging what? And with what rage, of what nature?

The second aspect that calls for our attention in this debate is, that one of the participants, a renowned professor and former dean of a university, shows a remarkable ignorance about South America, the topic at hand. It is true that the mere condition of being a professor doesn't exempt you from ignorance, but what stands out is that it is made of clichés unaware of being just that, clichés, or if you will, presented with all the insolence of the ignorance proud to be ignorant, as it often occurs.

If you allow me, this kind of ignorance is based on the absence of the capacity to see as well as a lack of curiosity. And let's recall that curiosity was to our ancestors the Greeks the very sign, the proof of youth. It was not a question of age as such – as youngsters and publishers often believe – but it depended very much on holding or not a certain attitude. You were young or not depending on your degree of curiosity.

The third act of this short theatre play, that takes place both in America and Europe,

was one month ago in Coín, a little town in the State of Malaga, in the south of Spain. A scenery I am certain many of you know, as it is the preferred place in Spain by northern Europeans in search of sun and good weather. I arrived there with great delight, after having been chosen by the students of a school to talk about one of my books for children: the biggest honour an author could have.

But it is not this meeting with students that I want to talk to you about, but rather an inscription that appears on windows and walls, on cars and roofs, that shows up everywhere: "Rio Grande Vivo. No a las tuberías". Which means: "The Big River is alive. No to the drainage". And the teachers of the school would explain to me later that a very advanced project is already in motion to harness the Rio Grande into big pipelines, as big as a river can be in the already almost deserted Andalucía. The project is meant to take the water to Malaga, city that not long ago was the refuge to the retired and the poets. But urban speculation and tourist industry without restraint are transforming Malaga into a huge city, which will become, with no doubt, the capital of southern Europe. A big city made out of a string of buildings all along the coast extending hundreds of kilometres. It is a nightmare that is already happening.

The fourth and last story takes place a few weeks before coming to Helsinki to this meeting. A publisher... no, that is not correct: a very good publisher is fired from



*General secretary of the Finnish League for Human Rights Kristiina Kouros is posing a question to the speakers.*

her job in Spain. And not without some quandary, as nobody questions her capability and professionalism as well as the high quality of her work. And one of her bosses, a top range executive of one of these big economic corporations, gives her finally a reason: "The problem is that you are too much of a publisher". This means, the reason to fire a high level cultural executive is that she is too diligent in her job. She is too much of a publisher. This means, of course, that she is more interested in good literature and less in revenue.

The reason why I have chosen these four little stories that I have witnessed along the past three months – sketches, or scenes, more than stories as such –, is that they are real and illustrate in a very graphic way the main challenges Europe is undergoing. The image of the journa-



*Pedro Sorela*

lists and writers confined to a tribune at the Barranquilla Carnival and guarded, without any possibility of going out to dance, shows how fortunate we are to have the precious freedom that we enjoy in Europe: it is our core value, without a doubt.

And also acknowledge how fragile it is, as we know now in Spain, where I live, and where a part of the population is kidnapped by a terrorist group in the name of some kind of ethnic purity and the borders of an imaginary country – as they always are – or something of the kind: it is always difficult to understand the fanatic reasoning.

The demon related way of challenging of a painter in a former church in Palermo – a painter that is supposed to be one of the contemporary geniuses of the continent – gives us an idea of the degree of superstition that has survived in the very core of our cultivated and artistic Europe. And the participation of the professor, filled exclusively with clichés, show how strongly culture and knowledge are vulnerable to deceptive and demagogic attacks. Culture is perhaps the main European value, together with freedom, and our duty is to preserve them and not allow them to decrease into post-cards and politically correct superstitions.

The story of the harnessed river speaks for itself: simply, urban speculation in a big part of Europe – apparently not so in Scandinavia, I must say with jealousy and delight, or not as much, by far – and it can finish forever with some of our most beautiful sceneries – our only wealth – and leave us with no criteria for beauty and harmony, with

which we measure the world.

And the firing of the publisher is the most graphic scene – among quite a few possibilities, believe me – to talk about the next big risk, which is the idea of revenue. The idea of revenue in culture at any cost, of culture as an industry and only an industry, is a bomb located at the base of our freedom, as we don't know a bigger and crueller censorship in History.

Freedom, Culture, Beauty, Nature, Diversity, and Consciousness of History, and a free and easy access to all of this. Those are the values that, in my opinion, we should not resign to lose.



# The stories of Europe

*Agnes Heller*

Hannah Arendt Professor of Philosophy and Political Science

We, philosophers, normally begin our inquiries with the question of "what is?" What is it that we now celebrate? What is the European Union? And what is Europe?

At the first approach the question can be answered easily. What is Europe, if not the stories told about Europe?

Many stories are told about Europe. And they are different ones. Some of these stories are irreconcilable with others. The reading of the past stories and their appreciation will be selective. But even if one does not today choose all the stories, one needs to remember all the significant ones. Not only for the sake of choice, but also for the sake of caution or rejection, we need to remember Europe's stories. Europe does not have so astonishingly many stories because it is the oldest continent, but it became Europe precisely because it has so many stories. Europe is simply a storytelling continent, a continent, which has established its identity as a kind of an autobiography.

Several autobiographies of Europe have been written or grew out since the time of early Renaissance. One story was about the Christian continent contrasted to non-Christian continents, another about the Occident contrasted to the Orient, another about the modern continent contrasted to the traditional one, another about the continent of white men contrasted to the continents of colored people, one story about the continent of science versus the continents of myths, one again about the colonizers against the colonized, and so on. As in all cases of identity construction, the identity of Europe has been constituted by contrasting "our" continent to the "others", to non-Europe.

Are these identities pure fictions or do they have basis in reality? It is difficult to tell these two entirely apart. Whenever an identity is constructed by stories, it is a fiction which is also reality as long as people believe in it, think according to it and behave in its spirit.

Furthermore, master narratives have to be differentiated from the identity constituting stories. Master narratives are the sources of imagination and points of reference to almost all identity stories. All people have master narratives. Europeans have, in addition, two shared master narratives and neither of them can be called a myth. The Bible has invented uni-linear history in contrast to the cyclic. Europe does not exist without sharing the image of uni-linear history. True, in the Bible uni-linear history is also a

history of redemption or grace. Europe may, sometimes, yet not always, secularize this story, but frequently it returns to it in the form of the image of redemptive history. The Greek and the Roman history and philosophy are the second most important European master narrative. The model of the republic, of the senate and of representation is Roman, and so is the Roman system of law. The model of democracy is Greek, and so is Athens also the model of culture. Already in Rome the persons who spoke Greek and were familiar with Greek drama and philosophy were cultivated.

Machiavelli, the Florentine Machiavelli was, in all probability, the first representative European. The specificity of the European stories is, as I already mentioned, that they are man-made, consciously man-made. Since Machiavelli through to Shakespeare myths as also legends had been translated into the language of history. Machiavelli interpreted traditional stories rationally. And, indeed, European stories are rational stories, they become more and more rational. European stories are parts of the process Max Weber described as the "disenchantment of the world".

In what follows, I will briefly discuss, three decisive identity constituting narratives among the many autobiographies of Europe. One is based on the contrast between free and despotic, the second is based on the contrast between modern, scientific, rational and progressive on the one hand and primitive, traditional and non-rational on the other hand – this model is already a synthesis of several stories. The third is the model of negative identity, where Europe is identified by the Europeans themselves with the colonizer, aggressor, exploiter, contrasted to the colonized, the victims, the exploited.

I begin with the first story, because it is in fact the first. Europe, the West, understands itself as the continent of freedom and contrasts itself with all the other continents, especially with Asia, and also with Egypt, as with the world of oriental despotism. This is the oldest stereotype. We encounter it already in Aristotle's *Politics*. According to Aristotle the Europeans love freedom, yet they are uncivilized, whereas the Asians are civilized, yet they do not care for freedom, The Hellens, however, love freedom and are at the same time also civilized. It is interesting, that in Aristotle's presentation the Greeks are not fully Europeans.

Europe, more precisely the West, has considered itself always the world of pluralism, contrasting the institutionalization of dual authority, the pope and emperor, to Oriental caesaro-papism, even if religious intolerance and fanaticism was as vehement in the West as in the East. European nobility understood itself as free; moreover, free equality was the fundamental idea of European nobility. Medieval parliament constituted and institutionalized this freedom. With the emergence of Protestantism, although for example in Italy far earlier, the extension of freedom is put on the agenda, and the interpretation of freedom receives a double meaning. In one meaning, and this is the Biblical heritage, it means liberation, liberation from slavery, from serfdom, on the

other hand it means the constitution of liberties, following Roman and Greek models. Both will be soon interpreted in the sense of free practice of one's own religion, of the free use of national language.

From the times of Enlightenment and especially the French revolution, the concept of Europe or the West gets slowly identified with Western Europe. The liberating dictator Napoleon carried this message through all European countries. Yet in the Napoleonic wars the story of liberation has already been intertwined with the second European story I promised to interpret briefly. Europe is not just the continent of freedom, the home of freedom lovers, but also the repository of a new idea, the idea of progress, which also includes the progress in freedoms. Nowhere else was the idea that all men are born free formulated, thought and developed than in Europe. The sentence that all men are born free and they are endowed with certain rights by birth plays from this time on a pivotal role in the European autobiography. From the moment that it had been accepted as an idea by a considerable minority, this slogan became an effective fiction, which transformed European constitutions and became the foundation of the American one. It was effective, for the three waves of political emancipation – the emancipation of Jews, the emancipation of the proletariat and the emancipation of women – were carried out by making the slogan effective.

According to the second European story Europe is developed, progressive, rational and modern. The Orient is stagnating, primitive, traditional and irrational. There are several variants of the narrative. In what follows I will simplify it.

Europe begun to identify itself with the enumerated characteristics fairly late in time. As the champion of Catholicism, Europe regarded itself since the 8th and 9th centuries always as the repository of the supreme truth, against Islam and Orthodox Christianity, not to mention pagans and Jews. Yet the Renaissance self-image of Europe already included the idea of progress and modernity so much so that the ecumenical conception of universal Christianity, termed itself *devotio moderna*. This was, indeed, an important turning point, since up to this time the Orient remained still the model of high civilization, and Europe considered itself at least in this respect as inferior to Byzantium and China. Through launching the so-called civilizing process simultaneously with the development of the new sciences, and the soon following industrial revolution, Europe slowly lost the last remnants of its feelings of inferiority. The trade of Chinese vases and textiles continued to bloom but now Europe had the wealth, the money to buy. The progressive West was developing capital, middle class and huge industrial cities. The West was moved even more westward towards the United Colonies, that not much later became the United States.

Progress in the modern sense includes expansion. One can expand in different territories and manners, and Europe tried out all of them. The colonies of the 19th



*Agnes Heller*

century differed essentially from the colonies of the 18th century. The little Europe became the master of almost the whole world. To be European, especially Western European, meant in this time also membership in the white race which claimed a right to rule the world. It became clear at this point, that two European narratives, the freedom narrative and the progress narrative can be interpreted in a way that the two interpretations become irreconcilable. Progress in the European narrative is also about expansion. But expansion in freedoms contradicts the expansion in rule or might at least in this case.

We have already entered the Europe of different nations, nationalisms both as centrifugal and centripetal powers within empires. The traditional story of pluralistic Europe assumes the form of a story of a great variety of nations. A new story is born, and the old one has been revised. There was no more European culture but various national cultures. Yet Europe still existed as such in the second half of the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th century. It was the Europe of the gold standard, of industrialization, of scientific discoveries, of social democracy of the free market, of one hundred years of European peace.

A Europe of peace was, indeed, a new story at that time, although it has been proposed earlier, e.g. in Kant's writing on the perpetual peace. The idea of perpetual peace joined by the idea of cosmopolitanism, remained at that time, as we have already seen from the story of Stefan Zweig, a utopia of goodwill, but a new utopia, the preamble of a new European story. With World War I, the original sin of the 20th century, from where all the evils of this century originated, an end was put to all utopian hopes.

The story of Europe in the 20th century is a story of continuous nightmares. Europe went mad. It started to write stories of madness. These stories seemed to be entirely

new stories of total discontinuity to all previous European autobiographies. Yet, this interpretation is self delusion. Europe went crazy, yet not without precedents, neither without preliminaries. The idea of progress, yet also the idea of freedom, gave birth to movements which did not know limits. There was a delusion of grandeur in the air. Europe went mad through its own practice of crossing all limits, through the constant, never ending uprooting of traditions, through the conviction that modern men can invent something entirely new at every moment, that one man, a self-made man, can replace the Messiah. The delusion of omnipotence mobilized by hatred against the "other" filled the body of the European continent with concentration and death camps. This was the Europe of Auschwitz and the Gulag. And this is also a European story, belonging to Europe's autobiography. It needs to be kept in remembrance as a story of warning.

Let me now turn to the third representative European narrative. This is the story of negative self identification. Europe does not tell a story of its superiority, but a story of its inferiority, moreover, of its own crimes.

This third narrative was first created by European intellectuals and became forceful after World War II in the wake of de-colonization and the lost pride of the "freedom loving Europe". This story also has several branches. According to the story told in one of its branches, the development of technology, modernization, even democracy, leads to nihilism, to the loss of independent thinking. What is called progress is truly the manifestation of decadence, decline. According to this branch of the third story, Auschwitz and the Gulag result from progress. According to another branch, modernity destroys traditional cultures and offers nothing but hunger and devastation. Instead of increasing freedom Europe expands the division of labor and makes us all slaves.

The new, third version of European stories is interesting not just because it coins a new fiction for Europeans, but because it simultaneously offers the same fiction to the "others". Moreover, the "others" use the European fiction for creating their own identity and coin the image of the other as "the European". This story has then several sub-branches such as a kind of cultural relativism, putting a premium on difference against universalism.

And here I stop to tell stories about stories.

I started this lecture by raising a philosophical question about Europe's identity. First the "what is" question I gave a preliminary answer to: Europe is the histories told about Europe. Following up this line of presentation, I started to describe a few European fictions, especially those fictions which strongly determined Europe's identity at least during the last five hundred years. But by describing those fictions, I have not answered the question what Europe is, rather the question what Europe was. For the

story writing continues in the present and is going to be continued in the future.

The question I would like to raise today is not whether Europe as such existed, but whether it is about to exist. Europe existed, since it has several stories, sympathetic and abhorrent ones alike. Whether or not there will be Europe depends on the question the youth of Europe today is going to raise. Their fictions, especially their effective fictions, which is fictions that they are ready and willing to act upon, will be the Europe of tomorrow. And today is already tomorrow.

I do not know what the new European story will be; only what I would prefer. Yet, I guess what it cannot be. The new story cannot be the story of progress, technological development and not even the story of modernity, for by now the whole world has become modern or is about to become so. Modernity, technological development or sciences are no more the *differentia specifica* of the European subcontinent.

One of the dominating European narratives remained, however, in want of constant interpretation, defense and elaboration. It remained a burning issue and demands continuous defense and innovation. This is the freedom narrative whichever form it now takes. Europe's first narrative was the freedom narrative. It was several times distorted, abused and belittled. The freedom narrative is the story citizens of the European Union should never abandon.

At the time of the Treaty of Rome, fifty years ago, Europe was still divided between democracies and dictatorships, even totalitarian dictatorships. Those states which entered the treaty committed themselves to the democratic order. And all nations which join the treaty since do the same. Moreover, 50 years ago, an old European utopia, which has never been effective up to today, became for the first time, at least among the partners of the treaty, effective. This is the idea of peace.

Yet there is not necessarily harmony between the freedom narrative and the peace narrative, because, as you may know, they can require two irreconcilable commitments. There is peace within the European Union. Yet, there is no peace in the world. And until yesterday, there were still wars in Europe and there can also be other wars in the future. Those who are going to write the European fictions in the future need to be conscious about some eventuality of grave importance. Namely, that there can become a time for a value choice between freedom and peace, between a general value choice on the one hand and a pragmatic, contextual choice on the other. As someone who lived in a dictatorship and survived two totalitarian regimes before having the first experience in democracy, I dare to give you one single advice. Give always preference to freedom in case of a value collision irrespective of the context. Following this advice may lead temporarily to unfavorable consequences, yet not to fatal ones, whereas choice to the opposite can prove fatal.



*The second day of the seminar was held at the House of the Estates (Säätytalo).*

The future stories of Europe will be written by the citizens of Europe and surely under certain given circumstances. Those circumstances can partly follow from the previous choices of European citizens. After all, it is still true, that if the fathers eat sour grapes, the teeth of their sons will be set on edge. If we choose other values, than freedom in case of an either/or, our children will be confronted by the consequences. True, the circumstance of our choices and actions in general can also be independent from our fathers' choices and actions. Europe belongs to the world, and must answer to the challenges of the world. And perhaps, European citizens can influence the course of events in a remote part of our globe. This is a new kind of responsibility, a kind of enlarged responsibility, which can be termed "planetarian responsibility".

For example, although totalitarianism has disappeared from Europe, it has not disappeared from the world. It is an ever present mortal danger. There are only two typically modern political institutions, ways of rule or domination: liberal democracy and totalitarianism. Totalitarianisms are constituted by totalitarian parties and guided by totalitarian ideologies. These two political formations, two kinds of rule, are each others mortal enemies. Totalitarian ideologues know this very well yet citizens of liberal democracies sometimes forget it. The world has always been a dangerous place. It is still a dangerous place and will remain so. The European Union defends its own citizens against dangers within Europe, and it will not create dangers for other continents. But the European Union cannot prevent the emergence of totalitarian states or empires which also threaten them. This should not be forgotten.

Political history does not develop alongside laws. There are several entirely contingent factors which can change the political climate to the worse or to the better. It is also for situations resulting from unforeseeable contingencies that I would recommend you to be guided rather by certain values, than to rely upon ad hoc pragmatic choices. Yet sticking to values or to ideas has nothing to do with being committed to ideologies. To rely upon an ideology is as dangerous as sticking to just pragmatic decisions. Being committed to an ideology resembles making a package deal. In case of a package deal one has to buy everything included in the packages. If someone is guided by an ideology, the situation will be similar. One has to take everything that belongs to the ideological core. All facts will be interpreted by the application of a ready-made frame. If someone is guided by an ideology, one will lose the capacity to think with one's own mind and, simultaneously, also to think from the perspective of the other and finally to think consistently. Immanuel Kant described three maxims as the maxims of common understanding: think with your own mind, think from the position of the other and think consistently. Ideologies of any kind prevent our mind to follow those maxims of common understanding. Think in the spirit of those maxims. This is all that I, based on my experiences, learning from my own mistakes, might propose.

In what follows, I will briefly enumerate a few problems you will in all probability be confronted with. I will speak solely about contradictions, occasionally developing into paradoxes, for those are the most difficult ones to tackle.

First the question of the relation between center and periphery. The European Union is an atypical Empire. Why Empire and why atypical? It is an empire similar in many aspects to the European empires before World War I. Those empires had an advantage against the nation states established after the process of secession. Namely, an empire has an economic weight far greater than the sum total of the economic powers of the composing nations. An empire is a big body composed of different nations and people who speak different languages and who cherish different traditions. And this is a great advantage as against the unrelated, independent, yet suspicious and sometimes even hostile nation states. Similar is the case of the European Union.

Yet there is an essential difference. Contrary to the old European empires, in the European Union no single state occupies a privileged place, there is no official language, and instead of an emperor there are central democratic institutions. This is an entirely new invention. In fact, modernity allows the invention of entirely new institutions and forms of integration and rule. I already mentioned that both liberal democracy and totalitarianism are entirely new inventions. Liberal democracy, as a new form of rule replaced old republics on the one hand and liberal monarchies on the other, totalitarianism replaced military dictatorships and despotism, and the European Union as a new formation replaced the old European Empires. It is very likely, that if liberal democracy expands, similar Unions can be established in other continents as well.

Still, there are a few problems to face, not entirely different ones from the problems the old European empires have faced. There is still, or at least there can be, a conflict between the center and the periphery, because just like in the case of most of the old European empires the center is richer than the periphery. In addition, the European Union shares an important tendency with traditional empires, namely that territorial and economic expansion is its life element. And the more it expands, the more the center/periphery distinction gains in importance.

I said at the beginning of this section, that the European Union is an atypical empire, for it has replaced the European Empires. It is a Union where the member states have equal standing, and where they remain independent nation states even if with a kind of self-restricted sovereignty. The difficulty to devise and to accept a constitution binding all member states with their own constitutions is a default resulting from a merit.

And second, the European Union is an atypical empire, because it has no army. An empire without an army is defenseless, for it must rely only upon its economic power or the military power of others. This problem needs to be tackled by the next generation. And it is not an easy one. If Europe develops military might of its own, it will be far more ready and able to withstand blackmail. Yet, then it needs to sacrifice one part of its wealth. The conflict between freedom and welfare will appear, in all probability, on the horizon of the Union in your lifetime. But even without facing this issue, no integration can be secured by economic advantages alone. Those advantages as they come can also go.

But even if the conflict between freedom and welfare is a matter of the future, another conflict has already appeared on the European horizon. This is the conflict between welfare and planetarian responsibility. By "welfare" I do not mean solely economic well being in this case, yet also the right to a conduct of life without imagined or real threat.

When I mentioned the issue of the constitution, I said that the difficulty to come into agreement has to do with the independent nation state status of the member states, that this debit is a credit. But this credit is also a debit in another relation. Nation states have serious difficulties with integration. I mean with the integration of people coming from other continents to a European nation state for economic reasons or as asylum seekers. Europeans have a planetarian responsibility; they have to offer at least some of them a place under the sun. Yet Europeans, at least the majority of them, fear for their own well being, they feel that they have a right to the ways of life that they feel are threatened.

From the perspective of the immigrants integration means acceptance and following

of the house rules. From the aspect of the host nation integration means, the provision of equal opportunity to the newcomers and acceptance of their being different. It is a fact that difference makes people afraid because it endangers their belief and confidence in their own lifestyle, in their own concepts of right, good and true. Integration that accepts difference means that everything that there is could also be different. The fear of relativism is an existential fear, where the word "existential" is used in another interpretation. How can this fear be treated, socially or even politically?

I used the term "political" because, at least in nation states with an actual problem of immigration, radical movements, especially populist ones, play on the strings of these existential fears. As they also play on the strings of fear in the case of all the other kinds of differences. Blaming scapegoats, canalizing life problems into hatred and resentment against the other are the oldest trick of humankind. Because it is the oldest it is also the newest. I repeat, that I do not tell you that you should solve an insoluble problem, but that your responsibility will be to tackle it to the point of a lasting, albeit always temporary reconciliation. The loss of positions and economic advantage is another existential fear.

I want to briefly mention three other issues which are in waiting to be included into a few new European narratives. More precisely, these are stories I am afraid of, and I now want you to share my hope that they will not become effective.

The first issue is anti-Americanism. It seems to me that lately some Europeans – and they are many – want to create and reinforce European identity by a forceful anti-American rhetoric and sentiments. It is not about the critique of president Bush that I am speaking of, but about the one sided and emotional rejection of America. Some Europeans, and they are many, begin to forget, that Europe went down to its knees before the United States rescued them from totalitarianism. And they did it twice, first from Hitler, later from Stalin. Surely you might say that it was also in their interest, but the fact remains that without the military and economic help of America, there would be no European Union today. The United States is the sole traditional democracy of the world. We can learn from them that democracy is difficult and sometimes violent, but can always be rejuvenated from within. And it is not a minor point, that anti-Americanism, at least its' extremely emotional expressions, is often the side effect of anti-Semitism, given that the United States supports Israel.

My second fear is slightly connected to the first. Americans are, perhaps, narrow minded, yet they believe in freedom and democracy. It is easily understandable that after the decades of real and forced enthusiasm required by totalitarian institutions, Europeans got sick of beliefs, became skeptics and sometimes even cynical. There is a European tradition to always turn to the central authorities asking them to put right a wrong. The support for paternalism is always a sign of shortcomings in democratic mentality.



*Agnes Heller and Alexandre Mirlesse discuss the spirit of Europe. Ms Sinikka Salo was the chair of the session.*

Simultaneously with expecting everything from state/father or mother many Europeans, young people included, turn away from politics, share the prejudice that this is a lowly profession and that all politicians are either stupid or corrupt or at least power seekers. The relation to the political class, to the state, truly resembles the relation to a weak yet autocratic parent. One expects everything from them, but despises them.

Politicians are in average not worse than doctors, teachers or chimney sweepers, neither are they better, they are just like them. They have to perform their tasks well, and if they do, they deserve praise and confidence, but not love. Only tyrants and dictators ask for being loved. And as far as power is concerned, we are all power seekers. Without being empowered to do something one can do nothing, achieve nothing, one remains impotent. Bacon was right, when he said that knowledge is power. Every student seeks knowledge, thus she seeks power. There is "power for" and "power against" something. Yet even "power for" requires sometimes the use of "power against". After all, we are all the heirs of the French Enlightenment. One can well employ one's power if one has at least some conviction. I repeat, not ideology, but conviction. There is no European Union without European citizens who believe that it is a good thing to be a member of this Union and to have it, who care for it, take responsibility for it and desire to empower it. There can be no democratic citizen without democratic mentality.

Now I turn to my third and last fear. Who invented the many narratives which have established and still establish European identity? They were chroniclers, historians,

philosophers, writers, painters, sculptors, journalists, movie directors, poets, theologians. Whether there will be new European narratives depends on the very existence of the story tellers, for without stories being told in the future, Europe will not exist in the future. The continent yes, the Union perhaps, a piece of land without spirit, an institution without spirit. The predictions of the most significant European philosophers were rather gloomy. They predicted that the instrumental reason, the spirit of technology will not destroy, but transform the spirit of Europe. Problem solving will replace storytelling. Until yesterday, European intellectuals influenced public opinion, politics, mentality.

A cultural elite is different from a professional elite. A professional elite is subjected to the division of labor, and there is nothing wrong in it. Specialization is the condition of good results. Yet a cultural elite is not about specialization, it is about democratic mentality, yet also about the breath of interest, about the readiness for reflection, for disinterested conversation, for public intervention. Is this still the case? Is there still a cultural elite in Europe? Is it in the state of disappearing, or, perhaps, is it in making? You would say that a cultural elite is the remnant of a social elite, antidemocratic, a kind of luxury. I do not deny that it is a luxury. So are flower pots, so is poetry, even emotional love. Who would like to live without luxury? Yet this is not what I wanted to say when I raised this last issue. There is no democracy without a cultural elite, as there are no stories told without it.

My prediction is, however, not gloomy. Modernity survives by being supported by two kinds of imagination: technological imagination and historical imagination. I do not believe in the demise of either of them.

## The elusive quest for Europe

Alexandre Mirlesse

Associate Researcher, Notre Europe

### Prologue: an evanescent idea

*"... tremulae sinuantur flamine vestes"*

OVID, *Metamorphoses* (II, 875)

"A fluttering tunic, trembling in the breeze": this is the last glimpse we catch of Europe in Ovid's myth, before she swiftly fades away in unknown Mediterranean waters, heading towards Crete on the back of her divine abductor.

*Quis enim deprendere possit / Furta Jovis ?<sup>1</sup> ...*

There is hardly a better image of "the idea of Europe", which we – like the helpless witnesses of Europe's kidnapping, looking from the shore at floating drapes melting into the horizon – have endeavoured to approach throughout our reflection.

At first sight though, the idea of Europe seems to be fairly clear and uncontroversial. My fellow speakers have now assessed all the aspects of European integration; backing the views of our host, the Finnish Committee of the European Cultural Foundation, we have agreed that the European institutional machinery cannot work properly without a cultural and spiritual underpinning; eventually, we have proclaimed that this "idea" of Europe should consist in a set of shared values, which are the best legacy of Western civilization. End of discussion?

\* \* \*

### "European values" from Resistance to rococo

Unfortunately, our solution has left two questions unanswered.

First, considering that Europe did not only invent democracy and theatre, but also the Gulag and the gas chamber, why should we sanitize the idea of Europe by getting rid of all its undesirable components? Why should we thus overlook what Ms Heller has just called "*Europe's negative self-identification*"? In doing so, we have not defined Europe as she is, but as she ought to be; we have not sketched an idea, but an ideal.

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1 "For who could discover / What Jupiter has taken?" – *ibid.* (III, 6)

Second, what do those "values" actually mean? What is indeed their practical worth? As Emil Cioran once bitterly observed, values are not invulnerable:

*« Les valeurs vivent du tourment où elles sont nées; une fois celui-ci épuisé, elles perdent leur efficacité, se changeant en formes vides, objets d'étude, presque présentes en tant que passées. »<sup>2</sup>*

Values, indeed, live of the torment from which they stem; once this virtue is exhausted, they lose their efficacy, transform to empty shells, objects of study, being almost more present in their past.

The European ideal was arguably never as meaningful and politically "efficient" as in the "torments" of the Thirties, when young *Personnalistes* like Alexandre Marc and Denis de Rougemont started to gather in small circles, trying to explore a narrow, humanistic Third Way between Communism and Fascism. Their project of an European federation, which has inspired many European leaders throughout the following decades, was the outcome of their intellectual fight against totalitarian ideologies. For their generation, thinking a united Europe was no intellectual game but a vital necessity: after the Nazi invasion, many of them even had to risk their lives to defend the very "European values" that have now become "the rococo of political discourse"<sup>3</sup>.

This sense of urgency is what separates our generation from theirs. In the meantime, the European Union has consolidated peace, secured prosperity and developed far beyond the expectations of its first leaders; but as if ideological exhaustion had to be the counterpart of success, "the idea of Europe" has become a worn-out slogan to cover an ocean of misunderstandings.

### **Instead of Moscow, Brussels?**

Misunderstandings have not prevented the EU from integrating its markets, unifying its monetary system and welcoming new member states. Originally, all this was the work of a small group of relatively unanimous, "enlightened" leaders, who benefited from the governments' benevolence and the peoples' indifference. After the Treaty of Maastricht, this became less true. With the rejection of the Constitution by French and Dutch voters in 2005, this first, "elitist" phase of European integration came to an end.

If there were now a second phase to follow, which would turn European integration into a larger, more ambitious, cultural and democratic process, the people would have

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2 Emil CIORAN, *Le crépuscule des pensées*, Paris, Editions de L'Herne, 1991, p. 86 (translated from Romanian into French by Mirella Patureau-Nedelco).

3 Cf. my interview with Andrei Plesu, July 2007: <http://www.notre-europe.eu/en/axes/visions-of-europe>

the last word this time. It is therefore our challenge to reconcile the European citizens with the European project, if we still want to progress towards an "ever closer union".

*Notre Europe* has consistently been committed to this task, which is the very purpose of our new research project about European identity. Accordingly, we designed, conducted and circulated our studies to bridge the gap between European citizens and policymakers. This is only partly original: over the last years, a lot has already been done to "enlighten" the Europeans. But in our opinion, policymakers, too, need to be enlightened. In particular, they need to understand the citizens' expectations, in order to really measure the effects European integration may have on their lives.

We have thus decided to explore the question of joint living in Europe today by looking at collective aspects of the daily lives of Europeans (eg. food and relations to territory; collective celebrations and holidays; relationships between elected representatives and the citizens). Our aim is to better understand who they are, how they live, what their experience of Europe is – in a word, what binds them together – with a view to inspiring the EU's analyses and actions, this by keeping its leaders grounded with the citizens' ways.

In the course of our research, we will also try to lay bare other misunderstandings, especially those that weigh on relations between East and West Europeans. In this respect indeed, European nations are far from sharing a political culture. As I asked the Romanian philosopher Andrei Plesu about it, his answer did not sound quite optimistic:

*"Right now, there are problems in bringing [Europeans] together. And I don't think anybody is to blame for that situation. The last decades have erected awesome barriers between East and West, an asymmetry in experience, in mentality, in openness. We can be polite to each other, pretend to get on: but real dialogue is hardly possible."*

He probably had in mind Vladimir Bukowski's provoking claim that "Now, instead of the USSR, [East Europeans] have the EU; instead of Moscow, Brussels; and still the same discourse: thrusting, optimistic, hell-bent on a golden future.", which he quoted later in our conversation. In spite of its irreverent tone, Bukowski's assertion is indeed a serious warning to all Europeans, reminding them that basic political concepts like "union", "federalism" or "democracy" have acquired opposite connotations East and West of the Iron Curtain – let alone many trivial words to describe "asymmetrical" daily realities.

## Rekindle the ideal

Helping Europeans understand each other, however, is already too big a task for a



*Alexandre Mirlesse*

research team; it is a mission that requires concerted effort by all stake holders. Yet it is not even enough to achieve our ambitions for Europe – for, according to Jacques Delors: *“rekindle the ideal, breathe life and soul into it, this is our duty if we intend to give shape to the Europe that we so dearly wish for.”*<sup>4</sup>

How can we “rekindle the ideal”? How can we win their hearts and souls of citizens to give a fresh impetus to the European project? In a word, how can we make Europe happen?

Professor Heller already answered these questions in the last part of her speech. As she stressed the historical role of the cultural elite in shaping of a European identity, she concluded that:

*“Without stories told about Europe there is no Europe. Whether there will be new European narratives, whether the old ones will be recollected, modified, challenged, depends on the importance or the very existence of the story tellers.”*

Today’s story tellers, though, hardly ever make themselves heard in European public debates. They are by far outnumbered by jurists, economists and, first and foremost,

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<sup>4</sup> Jacques Delors, speech in Milan, 1991.

politicians. They may gloat at the new breed of professional "Europe-thinkers", with their armada of standard questionnaires, official statistics and deluxe polls, but cannot challenge their lead. Most of them have already abandoned the thankless cause of Europe to embrace more rewarding ones. The remainder is sometimes asked to take part into courtesy seminars where, gathered in "representative panels", they have little choice but endlessly repeating the same, insipid truths.

Consequently, discussions about the EU have gained in expertise what they have lost in imagination. The projects that come out of them may be sensible and efficient; nevertheless, they often lack intellectual freshness and appeal. This has encouraged mutual indifference between the EU and the European cultural elite. As Mr Sorela and I put it somewhat bluntly yesterday: Europe doesn't give a damn about its writers, and writers don't give a damn about Europe.

To try and remedy this, my colleagues and I chose the simplest possible method: we decided to take an intellectual tour of Europe to visit and interview all the people whose works, personality or experience had made us want to "talk of Europe" with them. As a first step, we wrote a list of our favourites. Amongst them were famous or unknown writers, historians, architects, scientists, movie directors, painters, poets, musicians, photographers, theologians, and even a French cook<sup>5</sup>. When the list was complete, we started writing solicitation letters. As soon as the first – and rare – answers had arrived, I left Paris with a map, a notepad and a couple of books in my rucksack, to spend half a year collecting new stories on Europe across the continent.

### A Belarusian story teller

Two months later, I was sitting in a small, charmless café at the center of Minsk, in front of my first story teller: the Belarusian writer Adam Globus.

We had already been speaking for about an hour when he mentioned a novel he had once started to write, without being able to bring it off. Its title should



*Jarl Köhler from the audience is commenting the discussion.*

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5 See the interview with B. Fournier ([www.notre-europe.eu](http://www.notre-europe.eu) -> *Rencontres Européennes*).

have been *"The European"*. I could not but ask:

***What stopped you from writing your European novel?***

*- I felt time had not come yet. You can't write a great novel if it does not meet public expectations and there is no demand for such a book.*

*At the moment, people prefer reading Beigbeder, Delerm or Houellebecq, to quote but French writers.*

*Those writers are too ironic, too cynical to write about Europe. You know Theophrastus, Aristotle's pupil? In his Characters, he is quite clear that Ironic man is the worst of them all: he may joke, one can be entertained by him, have a good laugh, be merry – but not create.*

*You can't expect such writers, who deconstruct everything, starting with themselves, to build the common European house when their own is in ruins.*

***But who then is going to awaken in the Europeans this "want" for a great shared work, be it novel or political project?***

*- It is down to artists and writers like me to create this demand: it is my responsibility, my personal duty.*

*That's where I am different from my French counterparts: yesterday, I was fighting off the Soviet Empire; today, I must fight for the union of Europe.<sup>6</sup>*

Adam Globus' words, which I carried back to Paris through the rigid Belarusian border, struck me right away: in our times when irony and cynical detachment have become the trademarks of intellectualism, they are both an answer to Ms Heller's doubts and a challenge to all European "storytellers".

I left Belarus with another firm conviction: when thinking Europe, we should ignore, if not reverse, the categories of "centre" and "periphery". Most to the contrary, "marginal" countries – respectively people and communities – deserve a particular attention in this research. These fragile, uncertain nations often had to fight for their very existence. On the fringes of the continent, belonging in the EU is not always self-evident; thus, their reflection on European identity has a quality of unrest and necessity it frequently lacks in former Empires or old, self-obsessed nations.

Borderlands are indeed more likely to be familiar, albeit on a smaller scale, with Europe's identity dilemmas: in this respect, Finland's contribution could be decisive. Let Adam Globus have the last word on this point:

*"When scrutinizing an object, there is a tendency to think that the best is at the centre. But thinking Europe is like drawing a map: you start with the outline. It is at the margins of*

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<sup>6</sup> See the interview with A. Globus ([www.notre-europe.eu](http://www.notre-europe.eu) -> *Rencontres Européennes*).

*Europe that you find tension. That's where the hand trembles, where corrections are made all the time."*

### **Die beste Bildung (the best education)**

In the course of my travels, I had the chance to meet and interview a few other great "story tellers", whose contributions were published by *Notre Europe*. Once pieced together, these texts have built the beginning of a European narrative, which is now to be developed. New chapters need to be written indeed, new questions asked and new stories told, to continue fostering our readers' desire for Europe. May these fresh ideas inspire the action of European leaders as they inspired our research – and thus prove to reluctant intellectuals that Europe needs them more than ever.

I still fear, however, that my travels did not bring me any closer to the idea of Europe. They nonetheless dramatically changed my perspective on Europe – for I did not only meet with cultural *élites*, but with Europeans of all kinds. I became familiar with European railway lines or ferry timetables; I had to jabber in half a dozen of unknown languages; I came back alive and unharmed from allegedly remote, obscure (not to say barbarian) countries; eventually, I even had the joy to hear the improvised Sibelius concert that our gracious hostess, Ms Sinikka Salo, offered us yesterday, in the splendid dining hall of the Bank of Finland. All this made me feel more and more European. Goethe was right once again: *"Die beste Bildung findet ein gescheiter Mensch auf Reisen"*.<sup>7</sup>

For my generation, getting to know Europe as I did is still a privilege; for the next one, it will hopefully be commonplace. Such is my final wish: we must find a way to make this European *Bildung*, travels and experiences accessible – not only to a few students, businessmen and intellectuals, but also to workers, craftsmen, farmers and all those for whom Europe has remained, up to now, *terra incognita*.

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### **Epilogue: the founding of a European city**

*"Cum posuit iussam Phæbeis sortibus urbem »<sup>8</sup>*

*Ibid.* (III, 130)

The myth of Europe has a second part: so it goes on in Ovid's narrative.

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7 "The best education a man with a mind finds on travels" (Goethe, *Wilhelm Meisters Lehr- und Wanderjahre*)

8 "When he founded the city commanded by Apollo's oracle".

Distressed by his daughter's disappearance, King Agenor sends his son Cadmus on her track and forbids him to come back until he has retrieved her. As he leaves Tyr with a couple of servants, Agenor's son knows he will never see his homeland again.

Cadmus did not discover, indeed, what Jupiter had taken. As he eventually arrived to desert Beotia, where Apollo's oracle had ordered him to settle, he had roamed the whole world in vain and escaped many hazards. But, *orbe pererrato*, his trial had come to a happy end. The city of Thebes, which he founded, was to be one of Athens' most brilliant rivals. The surrounding land became his own, which he bequeathed with two durable institutions: the alphabet, and his sister's name.

He had become the first European.

May his story – the very first of all "European narratives" – inspire and comfort all those who wish to think Europe anew. Just like his, our quest for Europe in the immaterial world of Gods and essential truths is bound to fail: Jupiter will not give her back anyway. And Europe, after all, is only a piece of land. Now, the time has come to make this land our own: so let us unite our efforts to build up a European city over the battlefields of yesterday.

The Founding Fathers of the EU wandered through the same deserts. They nonetheless paved our way and laid the bases of the European city. Their heirs have set up new walls, opened new doors, raised new fences; they planned wide streets, established a busy marketplace and a parliament. Now, our city wants for an *agora* to bring citizens, translators, poets and storytellers of all nations together. It is thus our duty to make it live through unrestrained intellectual exchanges, if we want to realise the great "shared work" Adam Globus was hoping for – not an idea of Europe, but a Europe of ideas.







## **Future of the EU – Governance of Unity and Diversity**

*Paavo Lipponen*, Former Speaker of the Parliament

*Christoph Bertram*, Former Director of the German Institute  
for International and Security Affairs (SWP)

*Jean-Jacques Subrenat*, Ambassador and Chairman  
of the advisory board, Institut Pierre Werner, Luxembourg

*Hans von Ploetz*, Ambassador and Former Secretary of State



Paavo Lipponen

Former Speaker of the Parliament

Chairman, distinguished Chancellor, dear colleagues, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for your kind words, Mr Chairman. There are two things I'd like to announce immediately. First, Nokia has announced a good result today, beating all the competition. It may not be the European spirit. This is the Finnish spirit. And secondly, ladies and gentlemen, we've got a government. It's got a program with a European policy statement. I've brought my magnifying glass. I'm trying to find out what it really means. But I'd only like to quote one passage under the heading "The EU policy". The first sentence: *"Finland is an active member of the European Union showing great spirit of initiative and acting in the core of the Union's reform process."*

And this is the sentence that's being examined with magnifying glasses by everybody. What does it mean? Well, having been personally committed to bringing and keeping Finland at the core of the European Union, I take the positive side of this sentence. That is that even with this government, there's continuity in our European policy, and that we really want to be at the avant-garde of the development of the European Union. So even though I'm not quite sure whether this combination, this coalition, will stick to this, I trust that at least some members of the government must adjust themselves to being at the core. To set an example the Parliament where I was the Speaker decided to accept and ratify the so-called Prum Treaty on cooperation against international organised crime. A minority of European Union members belong today to this group. But the Chairperson of the relevant Committee in Parliament that time, Ms Brax, opposed joining that treaty. If we would not have adopted that treaty, we would not be at the core of the European union. To be at the core is to be at the avant-garde in all the fields where there is an avant-garde, beginning for us with the euro. So the sentence I quoted will be a test to the new government.

The European Union is still in a state of interregnum with the malaise we have had since the French referendum. And again we are watching how the French voters will behave and wonder what the leading candidates really want to be done with the Constitutional Treaty. I don't think we have clear answers. And even if there's a clear answer, we don't know whether the candidate really means what he or she is saying. But in any case, I think that we must and need to support the German presidency in its effort to bring about a consensus on how to deal with the Constitutional Treaty, and in general to develop a spirit of common interest. To support common policies, more of common policies for the European Union and to have an inclusive approach as far as the participation of member states is concerned in European matters. Because this



*Paavo Lipponen and Christoph Bertram*

is not at all clear in all the quarters in the Union. So I trust in the German presidency. But I also perceive an increasing realisation that we need more of a common policy.

We need to improve decision-making. We need the institutional reforms that it takes. I'm a member of the so-called Amato-group, and the approach to the constitutional treaty that we are working out seems to be becoming the general approach. That is that although we need a fresh start with a new inter-governmental conference, we need to keep all the essential content of the Constitutional Treaty. It is obvious that we need to strip the Constitutional treaty off its constitutional stuff to make it acceptable. We might talk about constitutional pomp. This is reasonable particularly because it is not a constitution. So it's been a bit misleading to the general European public to use the term constitution.

You may call it a mini-treaty. But it does not really matter once the essential contents, the innovations in the first and third parts will be there in the amended treaty that will emerge in the next inter-governmental conference. And then actually we need to wait until the result of the French election.

I'm hoping that there would not be another referendum in France. That would really mean that the whole process would be delayed beyond the 2009 target given



*Chairman of the session Minister Jaakko Itoniemi.*

by Chancellor Merkel. Actually, we need to adopt it by the spring summit.

Ladies and gentlemen, it would be unrealistic to imagine that closer integration beyond the Constitutional Treaty would be possible at this stage. I'd very much like to be a visionary at this meeting, but I think we need to be realistic.

Equally, further major enlargement is unrealistic. But it was skilful manoeuvring by the Finnish presidency – that I think was on the whole very successful – that at the December summit Finnish presidency prevented a declaration on stopping the enlargement. And now this consensus has allowed negotiations with Turkey to con-

tinue. I can only hope that it will be better understood in the European Union that enlargement is the single most important instrument in the hands of the European Union to influence the world. The European Union is like a magnet that makes countries in its neighbourhood reform. Of course, there are different speeds and even steps backwards in this process. But still gradually adopting values, standards, we think are, that we call European.

European Union is not a super-power that can project military power and hope to influence things that way. It is basically through the possibility to enlarge and to give neighbouring countries a membership perspective. Maybe not quite to all of them in our neighbourhood, but still a European perspective. To fix the borders of the Union and stop enlargement would be a catastrophic mistake.

The European Union is undergoing a critical test of what I would in this company call *Handlungsfähigkeit*. That will be to bring results, change things. There are serious major challenges: slow growth, low productivity, ageing population, vulnerability of energy supply, climate change, immigration. There's too much hype in the European Union at the level of Commission and Council, not to speak of the European Parliament, in setting goals. And there's too weak implementation of what has been decided. The European Union is losing dynamism. Population of the United States will, according to

some estimates, exceed the population of the European Union at 400 million around 2050. It means that the population of the United States will be going up, and the European Union population declining.

We need a more open immigration policy. The pressures are amounting our periphery particularly in Africa. If you talk to Southern Europeans you will realise that there is a tide that we cannot check tide, without a more open immigration policy. For there's a supply of labour: more brains and more hands for prosperity of Europe.

Economic problems are mainly to be solved at home, also in big member countries. The Nordic model has proven to be the best for Germany, France and Italy. It is about less confrontation, more cooperation, and a better consensus, if the problems are going to be solved. And Germany is now leading among the major countries in this respect. Public finances, pension systems, inter-twined with all this, has not been in good shape enough to foster confidence among citizens and consumers. So there has been a real lack of domestic consumption because of this low degree of confidence.

The latest test to the Union is to develop a credible energy and climate policy. The spring summit set ambitious goals, but important questions remain. What will be the effect on global sphere to the emissions? I mean how effective is this unilateralism on the part of the European Union, because the European Union is not going to make all that much difference. How are we going to implement the spring summit decisions? And what about the goals set there? Is it in terms of reducing CO<sub>2</sub> emissions that would be a clear goal or in terms of using more alternatives and bio fuels? In my opinion, this is another example of too much hype and too little implementation plans. So we don't know, for example, what is going to be our role in this process.

Ladies and gentlemen, back to the vision thing. There's a long way ahead of the European Union in becoming a world power, like becoming a member of the Security Council. Particularly in security policy (taking the example of Middle East) there's a long way for citizens to identify with the Europe of the European Union. Personally I think that basically a federal structure would be the best way to improve this basic attitude among the citizens because it would give the opportunity to define competencies between the member states and the federal level. And it would give a real opportunity to create a European political space. But that is pretty far in the future. We must, at this stage, digest the latest major enlargement and a new treaty. Anything more would be too much for the European citizens.

But naturally, referring to our excellent speakers this morning, we need to discuss what is Europe, what is it to be a European. It is very much about culture but also about the tradition of freedom that is of Western European origin. Europe was long, too long, divided between roughly speaking Eastern and Western Europe while Eastern Europe

was dominated by a feudal system and Western Europe by a relatively democratic and more open society. There was a great big difference in economic development because of these different structures. So Eastern Europe is now catching up.

What helps in this process is that there was very much in common in cultural ties. What I think still takes better recognition in the different qualities of the European Union is the basic sort of starting point for unifying Europe. That is that all Europeans are equal. This is not yet quite accepted everywhere in the European Union. There is too much difference between national, even ethnic attitudes. The same applies actually for enterprises. So one challenge that I did not yet mention but that is important is that we need to make the internal market function in a proper way and fight protectionist tendencies. But protectionism is not only an economic term. It's also a cultural term.

We can say as Finns that membership of the European Union has really made a difference in the cultural sense. We are now much more a part of European culture, and our culture is being better understood and accepted. And there's a much greater interest in our culture. In this way, having its roots in European culture, Finnish culture is becoming even more a part of European culture.



*Christoph Bertram*

Former Director of the German Institute  
for International and Security Affairs (SWP)

It's a great pleasure to be here in Helsinki with you, not least for a European. When Finland joined the European Union I thought thank God: here's another country which recognizes European integration as a political project, not just an economic one. When you look at countries and societies in Europe that have had problems with the project of European integration they are in particular those in whose discussions and referenda about joining the Union promises of economic advantages were the main selling point. It's not what European integration is about. The advantages are, above all, political – and they are extraordinary.

Now, we realise today – I think that's one of the reasons you are holding this meeting – that we are facing a kind of Euro-fatigue, even in Finland. I believe the reason is that for Europe to be accepted and welcomed in the daily lives of our citizens, it needs interpreters on the national levels and does not have them in a convincing manner in many countries today. The European institutions cannot make integration acceptable.



*Christoph Bertram and Jean-Jacques Subrenat*

While they are increasingly shaping the social and economic conditions in all member countries, they are simply too far away from the people and should recognize that professional performance, not public relations exercises, will be their best contribution to creating a pro-integration climate. The main effort, however, has to be made by those elected by the citizens to national parliaments. Past experience has shown that Europe is accepted and welcomed in our countries when credible politicians on the national level openly support it; in this respect, a crisis for Europe is essentially a crisis in the trust commanded by national politicians. In the two countries that rejected the Constitutional Treaty, such a crisis had long been brewing. Where that is the case, Europe cannot be translated, cannot be represented, will not be respected and welcomed – despite the immense advantages European integration has brought and continues to bring to Europe’s citizens. For this we need respected national supporters.

Yet just look at the immense advantages European integration has produced. We Europeans have established a formula by which countries can retain and develop their identity and yet work ever closer together. The initial fear, particularly in the smaller countries, was that they would be taken over by the bigger members, that they would lose their national identity together with their sovereignty. That has not happened, on the contrary. The formula of European integration has allowed both to work: diversity and unity. It has stipulated, as Paavo Lipponen has put it in this conference, that all Europeans are equal. Not just the big countries have a say, all members have a say. Finland would have no influence in Europe were she not a member of the European Union. She would then not be at the center but at the outskirts of Europe, looking in from the outside without any influence on what happens inside. For the first time in European history, big and small countries as members decide together in an agreed procedure on those issues for which national sovereignty needs to be shared. As a German, I would add one more extraordinary achievement, again a first in Europe’s recent history: Integration in the Union has reconciled Europe with Germany and Germany with Europe.

Integration has allowed Europe to have a say in the world. Of course, this does not yet apply to the more traditional aspects of foreign policy where governments prefer to keep control even if it means to forego the influence that joining together would yield. But there are already large sections of international activity where the Union represents and acts for its members – in matters of international trade, in international monetary policy (for those who have opted for the euro currency), in international competition policy, in development assistance and climate protection. Here, significantly, members have agreed to let a supranational body – the Commission or the Central European Bank – act and negotiate on their behalf. As a result, the Union has gained international influence and respect in these fields. Henry Kissinger once famously asked which telephone number he should call when he wanted to reach Europe. In those areas where the Brussels institutions have been mandated to act for the Union as a whole,

nobody enquires about Europe's telephone number anymore; they have saved it on their mobile.

Should the Union also be given the task of conducting, at a supranational level, the foreign and security policies of all its members? For the foreseeable future that is unrealistic. But intermediate steps can and should be taken, such as increased majority voting on these matters and a gradually larger role in traditional foreign policy-making for the Commission and the "High Representative" (who, thanks to some governments trying to please their domestic press at the June 2007 summit, will be deprived of the title "Foreign Minister"). What will, however, count much more than new treaties is the attitude taken by governments when they define their foreign policy objectives. Once they realize that the best way for each of them to have international influence is to translate national foreign policy into European foreign policy new forms of policy coordination will emerge. Surprisingly, most governments and bureaucracies have not yet recognized this. I am confident that they will sooner than later. In the globalized world, national European governments will exert influence only if they act together.

Among the advantages integration has provided is also the Union's successful enlargement – from the original 6 to now almost 30 members. Over time, this has created an unprecedented zone of stability in Europe which serves the security interests of all of us. Moreover, it is an object of international envy. When you travel around the world, you can meet many who admire the European model and would like to copy it. I agree with Paavo Lipponen that enlargement has been a great success to date. I differ with him when it comes to the future. Should the Union simply go on enlarging? Is there not a point when you have to say this is it, the Union's borders are now defined – we and the world know who is in and who is not? The Euro-fatigue experienced in many of our countries may also have its cause in the uneasiness many people feel over further enlargements. How far can you stretch the solidarity that the citizens of the Union owe each other without losing the citizens? And there is a foreign policy aspect here, too: if the Union does not know its borders, how can it then develop a "foreign" policy to the outside world? For both these reasons we need to rethink enlargement. It would be a bad result if extending the Union further would have to be paid for by losing solidarity inside and impact outside.

Let me end this brief presentation of the achievements that integration has brought us Europeans. It has freed us from the power rivalries of the past. It has given all of us, bigger and smaller countries alike, a voice and a vote in common decisions. It provides us with influence in the world. It has created a zone of stability and order which protects even those countries, like Norway or Switzerland, which are not – yet – members.

With achievements like this, how can anyone acquire Euro-fatigue? As I have argued,

national politicians are the essential moderators of European integration. When they are no longer fulfilling that task, we should challenge them. Political leaders that fail to advance Europe are failing in a very essential area of our national well-being and our national future. They no longer deserve our support, your and mine.

*Jean-Jacques Subrenat*

Ambassador and Chairman of the advisory board,  
Institut Pierre Werner, Luxembourg

I would like to first thank the chair of this seminar and all the organisers. And also Jaakko Itoniemi, the chair of this session. I am so pleased and honoured to be with such distinguished speakers this afternoon. All the speakers of this session were invited to forecast in a way "where will the EU be, say in 10 years from now". For my talk, the time line will be 20 to 25 years, in other words one generation from now.

If you look at the programme of this seminar, it is clear that many aspects of the internal development of the EU will be covered very thoroughly: institutional, social and cultural aspects. My presentation is centred on external constraints and developments: how can EU anticipate global trends and major challenges, in order to determine appropriate policy and undertake suitable action?

I would like to submit to you this afternoon just two sets of thought: One is three global trends which the EU cannot afford to ignore, nor anyone else by the way. And then



*Jean-Jacques Subrenat*

two major challenges facing us, our children and grandchildren as citizens of the EU.

So first three Global trends.

1) What key elements will impact the next quarter century?

Global warming, long misrepresented or simply ignored, is now recognized as "an inconvenient truth" to take the phrase from the film featuring Al Gore. Once only studied by scattered groups of specialists, this subject is now widely examined because of its predicted impact on agriculture and food, on world population trends, on the availability of resources, and on patterns of large-scale disasters (forced migrations, pandemic, hunger, violence). There is however good news: we are now in a state of heightened awareness. But although the EU is better prepared than most countries or regions, our preparedness can and must be improved: We should look not only at the consequences, for Europe, of global warming, but adapt or introduce new common policies and instruments, for instance on the long term availability of clean water. I recognise along with Paavo Lipponen that we should not have too many new ideas and policies and the important thing is to implement, but I think that if you have a long term view over a period of 20 or 25 years, some things are not dealt with sufficiently in the European Union and water is certainly one of them. The bad news however is that the way humanity regulates itself is still not compatible with the requirements of global governance. Multilateral institutions do not have the decision powers to do that, and for the time being there are no other tools of global governance; there is no rational link between population growth and local availability of resources; as for crisis management, the efforts are still mostly devoted to damage control after a crisis has erupted, rather than removing the causes of that crisis.

Here again, the EU is the only regional entity which has a complete range of instruments (joint policies, budget resources, rapid-deployment battle groups), in order to cover a wide range of crisis management requirements (conflict prevention, setting up and training police forces, post-conflict nation-building, setting up free and fair elections).

Another thing I would like to point out among the key elements of the next quarter century are population trends. Today the world population stands at ca. 6 bn, and forecasts place it at anything between 9 and 12 bn by the middle or towards the end of the 21st century. If such a rate of increase were indeed to materialize, it would bring about immense difficulties when compounded with the negative effects of global warming. This is not the place for a lecture on world demographics, but some elements must be briefly underlined. Among the largest emerging economies, three countries present quite different patterns: in India and Brazil, the proportion of young people will still remain exceptionally high for at least another generation, whereas in China

we already see the rising social cost of the fast-growing segment of elderly people. Here in Europe, today's EU-27 represents roughly 5 percent of world population. If current trends continue into the future, in 2020 the EU, even enlarged, would not represent more than 3 or 4 percent of world population. But more than sheer numbers, it is the ageing of our population which will create a great imbalance between us and a large part of the world. For the EU, it is high time to implement a harmonized policy regarding migrations, visas, work permits, and realistic conditions of extended stay in the EU.

Another thing I wanted to bring up under this title is energy resources and energy consumption. They have been recognized as some of the most powerful shaping factors of our modern world (manufacturing, transport, chemical industry) but also as having created new geopolitical paradigms (Middle East, Russia, Norway, North Sea). What will be at stake over the next 20 years or so? As proven reserves become scarcer, availability of oil will decrease as costs will rapidly rise, in proportions never yet seen since the invention of the internal combustion engine. To compensate for this worsening energy situation, several policies and technical innovations will have to be developed, and hopefully combined whenever possible: carefully and safely managed nuclear power plants, energy conservation, and renewable sources of energy: wind, solar, bio fuels, tidal energy, and "clean coal" if affordable. In this respect, EU-27 is certainly one of the better prepared areas in the world, from all standpoints: improved safety of its nuclear power plants such as EPR in Finland and France, R&D in renewable sources of energy, efforts at energy conservation.

Now, among the global trends my second point is, what will be some major economic and social trends in the coming 20–25 years? Research and development will be a decisive competitive factor, perhaps more than ever before in history. Among the many priorities for the near future, I would mention the development of energy-thrifty devices, and also further "convergence" in electric and electronic appliances (e.g. as is already the trend in the latest smartphones), meaning that more and more tasks will be accomplished by the same devices. The country-wide or even continent-wide model of centrally-produced energy will probably become less attractive, thus giving rise to more regional or local initiatives in power generation and consumption. In the EU, fossil fuels still account for about 80 percent of energy consumption; if we are to meet the huge challenge of the coming years, the EU should set up and implement a comprehensive common energy policy: single energy market, joint R&D, appropriate legislation.

World trade. For my generation, indeed for practically anyone attending this seminar, the pattern of the 20th century seemed durable: so-called "Western" nations had a quasi-monopoly on large scale industry and commerce, on the financial system, and on transport. But things are changing very fast: in this respect, March 2007 should

go down in history as the moment when China surpassed the USA as the prime commercial partner of the EU-27. The growing role of China is also reflected in the fact that it now accounts for a third of the chronic trade deficit of the US. And what we are experiencing today with China, we will probably witness tomorrow with India, South-East Asia, as well as some parts of Latin America and the Middle East.

A new international monetary order is emerging: after World War II, an overwhelming part of world trade and financial transactions was carried out in US dollars. This is changing rapidly, although the general public, and sometimes even the better-informed media, have not given enough attention to this major shift. Did you notice the historic event which occurred in March 2006, when the Federal Reserve in New York discontinued publication of figures pertaining to M3 (all negotiable financial instruments)? According to the US authorities this was "because M3 figures are no longer as relevant as they were in the past", but you might be interested to know that March 2006 happened to be the time when the proportion of US government bonds held by US citizens fell to about 5 percent of the worldwide total: does this say anything about the trust US citizens currently have in their own system? Let's have a quick look at some key world indicators. Today, only eight years after the founding of the European Single Currency, the euro already accounts for about one quarter of foreign currency reserves in the world. A bit more than half of current world trade is labelled in euros. Major actors like China are engaged in a policy of diversification away from the US dollars, mainly towards the euro. And the world oil market, which since World War II has used only the US dollar, might soon be using other denominations as well. If Iran is not engaged in a war, in the next year or two, oil may start being negotiated also in euros at the Teheran Exchange, and such an event would signal an end to the monopoly of the US dollars on fossil fuel markets.

A third point which I would like to make is what could a geopolitical map of the world look like, say in 2020 or 2025?

The world economy in which we grew up was shaped by World War II and the Cold War, which both contributed decisively to the consecration of US supremacy (financial, industrial, military, and as a social model). And of course, the implosion of the USSR and the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact favoured the emergence of the US as the sole remaining superpower or, as we say in France, the "hyperpower". The question now, for the whole world and for us Europeans, is whether the US will maintain that position of global supremacy in the next generation. In his latest book *Second chance*, Zbigniew Brzezinski suggests this might no longer be possible, and not only because of the Bush-Cheney presidency, although the military occupation of Iraq is hastening the trend.

Notions of security and defence have evolved very rapidly since the Berlin Wall was

brought down. From MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) to crisis management, from a mainly military approach to a more global concept of security, this change reflects changing patterns in world affairs: There are less wars waged by superpowers through local proxies, but more local conflicts between neighbours with different religious, social and cultural systems, but also fighting over access to resources such as water. And undeclared forms of war, which include state violence perpetrated by some countries against their own citizens, but also terrorism. By the way, I'm not suggesting that MAD is a thing of the past; on the contrary, I think proliferation will remain a major issue for the foreseeable future.

As mentioned earlier, the experience acquired by the EU in modern crisis management is unique (what Martti Ahtisaari accomplished in Aceh is just one striking example). The EU is not immune to terrorist attacks, and certainly needs to be better prepared. But it is also in our long-term interest not to neglect the causes of terrorism, notably poverty, social injustice, religious intolerance, military occupation. We must recognize that it is the lack of a decent future which leads normal young people into the fatal trap of suicide as a form of terrorism which they have been led to believe is justified, or terrorism made attractive by sheer desperation.

Today, what are the main geopolitical factors? Is our world still with one hyperpower (USA), or have we already drifted, in actual fact, into a multipolar world? Whereas the USA continue to enjoy the immense advantages bestowed by a unique combination of their strengths in the 20th century (role of the US dollar in many areas and activities, industrial capacity and military assets boosted by World War II, unlimited access to cheap energy), I perceive some new patterns. Research and industry are becoming more widespread (EU, China, India), and at the same time Washington will gradually have more difficulty in controlling the political tools of oil and gas, which are also in the hands of a growing number of rivals (Russian Federation, countries of the former USSR, Gulf states, China, Indonesia).

Tomorrow, geopolitics will also be determined by a wider range of criteria than today: though military power will remain important, other factors will have more weight in international relations and the global economy (e.g. China's "aid without overt ideology" in Africa, Asia and Latin America will give it wide access to natural resources). As for the exercise of influence, we can see that the EU and many of its Member States exert more attraction today, than either the USA or Russia, the two greying statues of the Cold War. If geopolitics are indeed undergoing such a major shift, then I believe that the EU, in spite of its fuzzy outline and shortcomings, will become more attractive and will be in a position to exert greater influence in the coming 20 to 25 years.

## 2) Global challenges facing the EU

What will be the shape and the nature of the EU, a generation from now?

From EEC-6 to EU-27, enlargement has been prompted by three factors: to broaden our economic scope (UK), for historic and cultural reasons (Greece, recognized as a major source of Western values), or as a non-military tool in the Cold War (the USA has always pressured the EEC, and now the EU, to take in Turkey; on the other hand, accession of Eastern European countries clearly illustrated their own determination to usher in the post-Soviet period in Europe).

Further enlargements? Today, this subject seems taboo. Over the past decades, we have established many criteria, but the EU still does not have one unified, overall concept regarding its ideal or ultimate shape. Nor have we determined whether various types of partnership, other than membership, should be proposed to would-be members.

What values, what type of identity do we intend to bequeath to our children: what cultural references, what social model, what linguistic tools? "Cultural diversity" is the current buzzword, but are we prepared to assume the cost of a generous policy (e.g. adequate attention to foreign languages in national curricula; cost in institutional terms, with translation and interpretation)?

How could EU already prepare for the geopolitics of 2020 or 2025? Let's see if any of the familiar patterns are suitable.

"Transatlantic relations" remains a mantra, but is no longer the real reference. The radical view I've just expressed is not only published by some foul-minded French intellectuals, but even by one of the preferred authors of the neoconservatives in the US, Robert Kagan, who has clearly announced that his country and major European countries "no longer share common values". The centrepiece of the North Atlantic Alliance, article 5 and its corollary of automatic US involvement in the military security of Western Europe, is in doubt ever since the 12th of September 2001, when Washington decided the military occupation of Iraq, and then tried to create a coalition of countries willing to carry out the orders established in Washington, not in Evere.

The "trilateral" model has a long, successful history, which allowed three different perspectives to merge: for Washington, how not to lose the advantages it derived from World War II; for Tokyo, how to be included in the same club as their former victor; for European capitals, how to ensure involvement of the US (including military) in Europe. But trilateralism, though still useful, is a bit *dépassé*, simply because it is no longer the preferred instrument for addressing global challenges.

"Nordic dimension" here in Finland, is really all about how to engage Russia. As a body, the EU has still not fully understood the importance of implementing a common policy vis-à-vis Russia and other countries with similar characteristics, but I think this was due to insufficient communication, and does not invalidate the concept itself.

Variable geometry combinations, from Visegrad to Shanghai: how to make friends and influence neighbours, seems to me one of the trends for the coming years. Governments realize that total alliances were suitable for the totalitarian nature of the Cold War, and that flexible arrangements are now more realistic and useful.

My personal conclusion is that EU and Member States, thanks to their collective and individual characteristics, are uniquely capable of approaching this new phase in the history of the world. We should maintain the Transatlantic alliance, even though it is no longer the ultimate guarantee it was meant to be. At the same time, the EU should dare to hold a more political view on its own future, and develop its already successful common foreign policy, with strong partnerships all over the world. It's up to us, and the people we vote into our parliaments and governments, to visualize the long-term global trends, and to prepare realistic policies for our common future.



*Hans von Ploetz*

Ambassador and Former Secretary of State

Thank you, Chairman. In view of the urgent recommendation of an Australian participant, that the EU should settle on one language if it wants to succeed, I am tempted to present my remarks in Finnish – just in order to underline that Finnish is and will remain a respected official language of the European Union. And to highlight that the European Union is not an international organisation like many others. It is a new type of international body in which 25 sovereign European states have pooled part of their sovereignty, a body that – without being a state itself – legislates and in that way governs.

By recognizing all languages of member states as official languages of the EU, we are drawing an important lesson from history: Our European continent has seen many revolutions, because nations did not want to be governed in a foreign language.

This does not imply that we don't encourage people to learn other languages, quite to the contrary: In our view knowledge of other languages indeed defines "Europeaness", the ability to speak and understand the language of at least one neighbour. In this context I remember with regret an observation I made during my term of office in England: just over 4 percent of all students choose a foreign language as an A-level subject. Monolingualism is no recipe for success in Europe!



*Hans von Ploetz*

European integration has never been easy, not only with respect to languages. So please, don't get too depressed about the present problems. Remember: Fifty years ago, when the Treaties of Rome were signed, Europe had just gone through the agonizing experience of the defeat of the European Defence Community in Paris. And just three years later, a competing European project called EFTA was created. The difference between the two, EFTA and, as it was called then, the European Economic Community or Common Market was fundamental: EFTA was an end in itself, while the Common Market was a step on a road to what was later on called an "ever closer union". The Rome Project for Europe turned out to be sexier, and thus survived.

Or am I wrong? Maybe EFTA is not dead after all? There are still strong forces who would like to see the European Union reduced to an economic association only. Some interpret – I think wrongly – the referenda in France and the Netherlands as an indication that this idea is gaining momentum in the founder states of the European Communities. In focussing on the pros for an European Constitution, it may actually have been oversold as the promise of too much unity and too little diversity – which was perceived as a threat by many.

I therefore agree with Paavo Lipponen that sober honesty and a certain sense of humility is called for when dealing with European integration. This is why I like the way the subject of this panel has been formulated, and congratulate Sinikka Salo and the committee for choosing such an intelligent approach. Surely a lot of thought has gone into it.

I vividly remember the first EU-enlargement after the end of the cold war, which was also the first that crossed the line drawn by the creation of EFTA enlargement. Finland, Sweden, Norway and Austria were the candidates, and all but Norway joined. The degree of public enthusiasm in the four countries was very different. Among the Nordic states, Finland was the most focussed and determined. I think here the security dimension of European integration had a determining impact on the attitude of the Finnish people. For the Norwegians, it practically played no role, because the country – as a founding member of NATO – perceived no deficit in this respect.

The security dimension of the EU has moved to the foreground. Opinion polls in all member states confirm that the large majority of our citizens want more unity and less diversity in this field – also in terms of common military action. They understand very well that there are challenges and threats in this world of today which none of the EU members, big or small, can master alone. They understand that in fact even the biggest and most powerful countries in the world are not able to deal with these challenges alone.

The underlying principle of more unity is more solidarity, one of the core pillars of EU

integration. Even though the European security policy has not yet been fully defined, the EU is taking on more and more responsibilities in this field. This is the road to take. Progress and success in this area will definitely strengthen public support for integration.

Therefore the recent EU summit in Berlin, in celebrating the 50 years of the Roman Treaties, hit the right note in redefining the purpose of European integration: "We are facing major challenges which do not stop at national borders. Europe is our response to these challenges."

For all of us who have participated in the drafting of European texts, the Berlin declaration is an extraordinary achievement in its brevity and its understandable, clear language and message.

Did this message come across? Do our citizens actually realise that the EU has already managed to meet a number of big security challenges with great success? Let me mention just two examples.

The recent eastern EU enlargement is such a resounding success – in all its dimensions. But the famous "Polish plumber" made the headlines, although the countries most concerned have by now discovered what a blessing a good Polish plumber – or, in more general words – freer movement of labour in the enlarged EU is.

Since things are going well, nobody remembers the doomsday scenarios which dominated the European security debate immediately after the fall of the Berlin wall. The possible re-emergence of minority problems, border issues and other demons of the past in Central and Eastern Europe that started to raise their ugly heads. There was hardly any border in central Eastern Europe that had not been changed at least once but often three times, all in the last hundred years!

When I was the German NATO Ambassador in the early nineties, a Hungarian colleague one day asked for a very private meeting to present his authorities' national threat assessment. On his map Hungary looked like a country encircled by hostile neighbours. Who in turn made the opposite threat assessment! Developments in Yugoslavia reinforced the need to take these threats seriously.

In the EU, we were very conscious of them and defined our common approach with a view to maximising the pacifying powers of European integration. The policy of association first and membership thereafter proved to be, as is turned out, a farsighted, intelligent and extremely cost-effective policy of preventive crisis management. The conditioned but credible promise of EU membership focussed the mind of the leaders in Central and Eastern Europe on the most vital interest of their peoples. To join the

EU which made peace and prosperity possible.

European Monetary Union is another case which proves that successful preventive crisis management hardly ever gets the credit it deserves. Paavo Lipponen personally and as a politician contributed tremendously to achieving it. Today, nobody ever asks why our economies have not suffered more from recent cases of volatility of global financial markets under the impact of the globalisation. And yet, it would be easy to make the case that we would have been much worse off, we the Finns, the Germans, and the other members of the EMU, had we not mustered the courage to create a strong big common currency.

So, in looking at the constitution, I think the following strategic thoughts might help in moving forward:

- Our citizens are by no means opposed to unity and common action in Europe – where necessary. But they insist for good reasons on diversity and diverse action wherever possible.
- The inherent tension between these two objectives is obvious. But it is equally obvious that over time we have resolved it differently, as we and the world have changed.
- We should therefore be ready to re-examine the attribution of powers to the EU where necessary with an open mind: Are matters which we traditionally considered off limits for the EU dealt with appropriately and effectively by the nation states in today's environment?



*The first sessions of the seminar took place at the University of Helsinki.*

We must be permitted to challenge the underlying assumption of many national politicians that things would be just fine if they were left to our individual states. For good reason cultural matters are left to national governments. And yet nobody can deny that national education, a core area of the *chasse gardée* of our states, has greatly profited from the introduction of European benchmarking in form of the Pisa ranking. Today, it is futile to deny that such a thing as a global market of higher education exists. In fact it is one of the fields of services which generates year on year impressive growth rates. We have to recognize this fact if we want to remain competitive. Promoting a common space of education and research in the EU and the Bologna process are therefore important steps in the right direction.

- Diversity is a defining factor for Europe – not only of languages and culture, but also history and geography. All these things that make us different constitute the wealth of Europe. But is it really reasonable that these issues are mostly discussed in a defensive mood? Is it not also true that this cherished will only survive in an atmosphere of freedom and of tolerance?

Therefore: like solidarity which I mentioned earlier, diversity, freedom, and tolerance are also defining principles of Europe and of the way in which we want to live on this continent. Has any of the critics of the draft constitution actually noted that it – for the first time in the history of integration – mentions tolerance in a treaty as a defining principle of the way big and small states live together on this continent?

- Then let me ask a last question: how can we actually hope to overcome what Christoph Bertram called Euro-fatigue? With the help of new documents – constitutions or other? Hardly, essential as they may be. The real test for European integration is whether it delivers peace and prosperity.

Did the Rome treaties deliver? They promised ever-growing economic welfare in a climate of social solidarity, and they promised peace. Until the end of the cold war, which more or less coincided with globalisation, Europe (and NATO, not to forget this vital security guarantee) delivered: There was growth year on year, and there was no war in Europe.

Then, things deteriorated: unemployment started to grow. Finland went through a serious economic crisis, others too. And there was war in Yugoslavia and other places. Who was to blame? Of course "Brussels", nobody blamed national governments! Hardly anyone took the trouble to ask whether member states had actually empowered the European Union to engage in military action in order to safeguard peace outside its borders. The treaties did not provide for that. But our citizens expected action, common and determined!

By the way, the same is true today with regard to Russia: Our citizens would welcome

a solid common policy on Russia. Do we have it? The answer is affirmative – in principle, as radio Erivan used to say. But the reality is unfortunately different.

And yet: Is there on our continent a single more important bilateral relationship for each of our countries and the EU collectively than that with Russia? Does anyone have doubts that this challenge – but also the chance of meeting it – is so big that it calls imperatively for a common policy and common action?

It would be wrong to join the blame game and hold the EU mainly responsible for what is presently wrong in EU-Russian relations. It always takes two to tango. But more progress on the road to implementation of the "four spaces" we want to create between the enlarged EU and Russia is possible.

Finland has, nevertheless, made considerable headway during its presidency. Germany presently follows up in the same spirit and hopes to debloc negotiations on a new basic treaty with Russia. An important treaty that should deal with all aspects of relations, including energy.

The worrying degree of diversity between EU members that threatens to make progress in the first semester of 2007 impossible is no real surprise. It can be explained by the different history and geography of our countries. However, reconciliation of this diversity with the need for a common policy is a must, however difficult.

The success of European integration and the Atlantic Alliance should teach all of us the lesson that, while it is essential to know and never forget history, it is not possible to walk into the future with eyes only turned backward.

I am convinced that the key to a solution will be found on the basis of the right understanding of solidarity: In every enlargement, the members of the EU have pledged solidarity to the new members. In the mid-nineties, this pledge made the difference for the Finns when they joined the EU. It should make it now for the Baltic States and Poland.

This valuable coin of solidarity, however, has two sides: Finland's contribution to promoting common policies on Russia is an excellent demonstration of the fact that solidarity is no one way street.

If there is one issue in realm of foreign relations of the EU where in the case of doubt the EU should always opt for unity, it is in the endeavour to shape its relations with Russia constructively in direction of a true strategic partnership. It is in our common interest that a book titled "Who lost Russia" will never be written. To consider obstruction of a common policy a "victory" is difficult to understand. Victory against whom? Against Europe? Is that the enemy?







## **New Media and Culture: Crossing Borders and Understanding Diversity**

**One website, 50 countries and five languages**

*Nicola Mullenger*, Communications, LabforCulture

**Redefinition as an identity**

*Umayya Abu-Hanna*, Cultural Diversity Coordinator,  
Finnish National Gallery

**Understanding diversity and creating  
a European public sphere**

*John Lambert*, Editor-in-Chief, [signandsight.com](http://signandsight.com)



## One website, 50 countries and five languages

*Nicola Mullenger*

Communications, LabforCulture

LabforCulture is a partnership initiative of the European Cultural Foundation (ECF), which is one of Europe's leading independent organisations devoted to cultural development and is a passionate advocate of cultural cooperation. Founded in 1954 and based in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, the ECF campaigns for, initiates, develops and supports cultural cooperation activities across the broader Europe.

LabforCulture – the concept – stems from the Ruffolo Report<sup>1</sup>, a review of cultural cooperation that was published by the European Parliament in 2001. The ECF wanted to respond to one of the main recommendations of this document: the need to provide a networked online platform of information and resources profiling cultural cooperation across the broader Europe.

The Ruffolo Report outlined two reasons why a tool like LabforCulture was necessary. Firstly: the exchange of cultural experiences encourages understanding of each other, whether across borders or between different member groups. Secondly: the existing resources in 2001, and the proliferation of web portals following the advent of the Internet, made it difficult to find clear routes to information, especially in the realm of cultural cooperation.

The resulting LabforCulture site took two years to build and went live in June 2006. As well as receiving support from six cultural ministries – namely Cyprus, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, The Netherlands and Spain – LabforCulture has also received support from several foundations across Europe.

LabforCulture is now the essential online tool for everyone involved in arts and culture who creates, collaborates, shares and produces across borders in Europe. With its searchable database, it seeks to provide a platform, linking existing online resources and guiding the information seeker with key descriptions of those resources. Another key remit of LabforCulture is to fill information gaps on cross-cultural activities within regions that have been traditionally under-represented across Europe.

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<sup>1</sup> The Ruffolo Report on cultural cooperation in the European Union was commissioned by the European Parliament in 2001.



*Nicola Mullenger*

Visitors can submit their own content to the site and can personalise LabforCulture by registering, creating their own profile and posting blogs. The information on the site covers 50 countries across Europe in five languages: English, French, German, Polish and Spanish. The site uses open source technologies and is published under a Creative Commons license, allowing people to freely distribute and republish content.

The idea of net cultures raised by Mr Jesień<sup>2</sup> was noted with interest. What the LabforCulture team is noticing is the gradual build up of an online community using the site – either promoting their work or searching to link with like-minded individuals. Using emerging technologies, LabforCulture is building online tools into the site such as messaging services to your mailbox, book marking and interactive commentary tools such as blogs and forums. These are fostering debate and exchange.

The online community visiting LabforCulture is largely made up of European citizens

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2 Mr. Leszek Jesień, Head of the European Integration Chair, Tischner European University in Kraków, Polish Institute of International Affairs, Warsaw gave the presentation "Spirit of Europe. A view from Poland" on the 19th April, 2007.

across the broader Europe, but the site also attracts global visitors who work with or are interested in Europe. Because the Internet is a medium without any borders, we see a local, national, European and global engagement in the LabforCulture community. We also see the urban and rural citizen engaged, brought together by their common interests, work or passion. This brings an interesting view on borders and diversity. The platform encourages collaborative working, thinking and sharing, across groups and geography. Again this is partly facilitated by the medium, and is also enhanced by LabforCulture's promotional campaign, which seeks to widen the site's reach with an inclusive approach.

A researcher at a university in Sweden recently commented that "LabforCulture is the future". This comment may arise from the fact that we are constantly responding to the needs of our community of users. It may refer to the fact that, often, the cultural sector shows a lack of confidence and engagement in the use of online tools. To respond to this, we have been carrying out on-the-ground workshops across Europe and are currently working in Istanbul. LabforCulture also has plans to visit Turin, London, Warsaw, Krakow and France during the coming year. Also a new launch of the site in May this year includes a site tour that provides the visitor with an overview of what is on the site and how to access it.

To conclude, LabforCulture is offering tailor-made information plus a community space for the arts and culture community in the online world of social networking sites and information sites. One website, 50 countries and five languages. It's never been easier to find out about everything that's happening across Europe in the world of arts and culture. So be part of something bigger by visiting [www.labforculture.org](http://www.labforculture.org)!



## Redefinition as an identity

*Umayya Abu-Hanna*

Cultural Diversity Coordinator, Finnish National Gallery

I'm originally a Palestinian. I was born in Israel and have been living in Finland for 26 years, which is most of my life. The minute I land anywhere in Europe, I feel safe. To me it's safety, and it is home. It's a place; it's not about values. Because real values are humane: if you want to take freedom, human rights, equality and democracy and call them European, you are saying that the rest of the world doesn't share the same values. But we can discuss that a bit later.

At the moment I'm writing a book dealing with Finnish history, my 26 years in Finland. About what it means to be European today. What kind of culture makes me identify myself to Finland or generally to Europe. My brother lives in Amsterdam, which is a home for me too, where my family lives and whose history and debates I follow.

I'm going to talk about something that is behind cultural activities. We do have the technology, we do have the good will, we have money. And we have a lot of wonderful cultural activities. But what I think should be addressed and should be dealt with, is not celebrating European identity nor celebrating diversity. It is re-negotiating power. We need to ask: Who defines quality, who defines "Europeanness", and who has the right to do so? Who defines European writing? European writers? Who is sitting on the model of goodness or high culture? If a certain idea of clear Europeanness is agreed upon, it means hybrids like me are excluded. I have a comment about good European writing. In my opinion Zadie Smith, or Hanif Kureishi or the Swedish Jonas Hassen Khemiri are the European writers of today. The idea of Europe in the cultural sense is not looking for "the" Europe as a culture but a European setting with multicultural, hybrid and diverse changing culture.

Though we all have a collection of different identities, I feel more relaxed in the US than in Europe. In the US you are not as easily defined by the way you look as you are here. In Europe I'm the one who is stopped at every airport and asked to show my European passport, because I look different, me and my brother, we look as the source of fear. Europe is proud of its values and respect of human rights, but you need to be able to face realities, not theory. And nowadays we do fear. And that translates into a different reality, reality is tested by the "other". I am a suspect at every airport and traffic light, while any other white blonde from Siberia or South America would easily pass as a "safe good European". In the end, I look like the "source of fear" and being European is still about being white. To me, reality is the test of the European Identity,



*Umayya Abu-Hanna*

not a sophisticated brochure by cultural politic makers.

It's a very positive sign in the Finnish culture that the Finnish National Gallery appointed a Cultural Diversity Coordinator, the post I am in now. Finland has less than two percent of its population as immigrants. So there's an assumption that Finnishness and Europeaness is something clear and easily defined, the "other" can be recognized by half a glance. Museums work globally, and they deal with very universal issues. You might recognize Finnish photography, but not very much in the field of painting. Internationally and now in the Finnish National Gallery we are at a stage of rethinking main issues. Who defines high culture, good culture, the function of a certain Finnish museum, who are your clients and why would they visit you? All this is at a stage of re-evaluation. What is Finnishness, when does the story of Finnishness start, when does the story of Europeaness start? It is a very good sign that Finnish culture is ready to face the issues of reconstructing new stories, new identities and asking questions that might not have a clear answer.

I'm also part of the Finnish Arts' Council. And there you can see that we still don't have a clear cultural policy dealing with the changing demography and new diverse and hybrid cultures. We don't have a clear cultural policy on where we are heading to, what kind of Europe, Finland, or how to make space for multi-vocalism. Good will is not enough. If you don't know where we are going, anyway we'll take you there. And

to know where you are going to, you need to debate all options and making a choice is an ideological process. This kind of consciousness needs debate and readiness to face issues of conflict. It takes a new attitude to be able to face the European future.

From where I stand (if you want to call it the outside or inside the society from the immigrant point-of-view), the two centres of Europe are now Amsterdam and London. And it's not because the Dutch culture or the British culture are very wonderful. But they happen to be the places where there is research work and innovation. Maybe out of necessity, but both cities are where most immigrants would like to live and work. Let's not forget that we tend to make two mistakes: inventing the wheel all over again and again, and falling in love with wonderful theories and texts. Some of the best innovations should be simply shared and even copied. And some simple technologies should be used in order to preserve and develop cultures. Take the digitalizing of museums or archives. For example the archiving of immigrant cultures, urban and suburb histories has not specific museum nor space to be archived or exhibited in. All the art, history, new stories of new-comers, changes in the city and country have been dealt with digitally in Amsterdam in a most fascinating, functional and innovative way. This was done by Imagine IC and the LabforCulture which are wonderful things that should be copied. Good functioning cultural models can enhance democracy and the developing of Europe as a cultural entity.

I just want to finish by saying that I would really recommend each of you to send their DNA to be checked through the National Geographic. The project is trying to find out how humans left Africa, where they roamed, when and how. I bought the package, and my mother told me "are you so stupid you're from Africa, you know. Give me the hundred dollars." But anyway I got my results. Of course, I'm only a woman, so I have my XX chromosomes, it doesn't tell about my Y chromosomes. So my first origin is in Eastern Africa, but then my DNA route goes, surprise, surprise, to Eastern Carelia and Lapland (the Same). So I have Eastern Carelian and Same DNA in me plus a big chunk of Celtic DNA. About 15000 years ago when the Finns and Sames were still near Babylonia we shared a common great great grandmother. All my other Finnish friends' maps and DNA were going all over Europe, in Greece, Spain and whatever. But I'm very boring, I just go straight to Eastern Carelia, Same, so in a way I am a very pure Finn and always have been.

It is good to think what is the exact time span we want to include? Why would we think that Greece and philosophy are our start? We could see things from many perspectives. We can redefine who we were as much as who we are. We can use as long or as short a history as we want, underline glorious stages or totally forget part of our horrific history. But we have most power in shaping who we will be. "Europe" does not exist, it is made.



## Understanding diversity and creating a European public sphere

John Lambert

Editor-in-Chief, signandsight.com

Hyvää Huomenta. How ware la vita, if todos citoyens der Union Europea könnten hablar la même lingua? Tutto would be viel easier. Het is l'idée de la Sprache Europan-to. Una lingua, die all Europäer can parlare sans muchas Mühe. Man has seulement da Kombinieren le parole, die man von todos le lingue knows. Quarante-deux Prozent Ingles, thirty-eight pourcent French et der resto just how es kommt. Nada Gramatik, null ortografia, but muchos divertimento bei the Freistil kommunikazione with allen altri Europäern!

There we have the problem in a nutshell. Our session today is entitled "Understanding Diversity". But the first question we have to ask is: is "understanding diversity" not an oxymoron, a contradiction in terms? This problem was very well set out in yesterday's excellent panel. Paavo Lipponen made the point that we lack *Handlungsfähigkeit* – the ability to act – in Europe. The question we are faced with is real: What is, and how can we create a "handlungsfähiges Europe" – if you'll pardon me for slipping back into Europan-to here.

Hans von Ploetz spoke of the Europe of values, and the need for such values. And just now Agnes Heller has raised the point that if you asked many Europeans about these values they simply wouldn't understand the question. In his talk, Jean-Jacques Subrenat asked how we may not only stress European values, but also "exercise our influence". Now I would suggest that in order to exercise such an influence you first need to create the climate to do so.

Let me ask you: where should these values come from, where do they emerge, where are they expressed? I'm sure Agnes Heller will agree when I say that they come from our journalists, and those authors who express themselves in our newspapers. We, the journalists and authors, are the creators of values, those who work them out in practical terms on a case by case basis in the newspapers. Now you will ask, alright then, what are these European journalists saying? And the clear answer is: nobody knows!

Because despite the admirable quality of the newspapers in Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and of course also here in Finland with the *Helsingin Sanomat* and *Hufvudstadsbladet*, among others, there is nevertheless a real tendency to sit back on our laurels, a tendency to provincialism, so that as far as our papers go we tend not to look farther



*John Lambert*

About the first, signandsight is an online cultural magazine. There is no paper version, you can't buy it at a newsstand. Certainly, one inconvenience here is that you can't unfold it on your knees in the park or light fires with it. But the benefits are tremendous. And these are: access to practically unlimited content; and the possibility for readers to create their own journal by following the links they choose. Let me give you an example: many journalists praised a debate on multiculturalism launched on our site recently – I'll go into this in more detail in a bit.

For now let me point out one example: the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* stressed that with the debate we realised the utopian idea of a universal public sphere. I quote: "One of the canonical ideas of the Enlightenment was that of a universal public space to which all intelligent humans could have access at any time or place. The Internet cultural platform *perlentaucher.de*" – our sister site – "shows that this utopian idea is entirely realisable today". The paper continues: "This debate shows that the Internet is an eminent forum for debate. Readers need not keep a bulky archive as with newspaper debates; all contributions are available with the click of a mouse. Links allow readers to check for themselves what Ian Buruma and Timothy Garton Ash really said in the articles so roundly attacked by Pascal Bruckner, while further links lead beyond the

than our own noses.

Let me give you two examples: When in Germany the philosopher Jürgen Habermas launched his "core Europe" initiative, no one joined in the debate. And who had heard of Theo van Gogh before he was murdered in Amsterdam? I mean, if someone has to get murdered for us to hear about them, soon there'll be no one left to talk about – or to do the talking!

What this boils down to is the question: is there a European *Öffentlichkeit* – a European public sphere? This is what we are seeking to achieve at *signandsight.com*, and we have two tools for doing it: the Internet, and the English language.

immediate context of the debate. In this way an extremely complex field of discussion may be accessed at any time. And signandsight.com makes this debate accessible to a global audience.”

Regarding the second tool, the English language, it might strike one as paradoxical when I say an English-language publication is the best method for expressing the regional particularity of public spheres in, say, Hungary, Poland or Ukraine. But it’s not a paradox, it’s a fact, and it’s demonstrated by what we do.

signandsight.com is the English service of the German website Perlentaucher – it means “pearl diver” – who review and link to practically all the quality German feuilletons, or cultural pages. In Germany these are an exceedingly rich forum for debate, not just on the arts, but on culture in the large sense, including politics. A good example will be found on our site: our most recent articles are on current events in Russia and Ukraine.

And not only is the scope of debate large, so is the scope of authors writing in the feuilletons. I’ll come back to this later, but let it be said now that the German feuilleton was instrumental in making the Hungarian author Imre Kertesz widely known, before he won the Nobel Prize in Literature.

What we do at signandsight.com is first, a short daily press review of what is written in the feuilletons. If Jürgen Habermas, Peter Schneider, Bernard-Henri Levy, Ayaan Hirsi Ali or the Iraqi writer Abbas Khider have written an article or given an interview, you’ll read about it on our site, in “In Today’s Feuilletons”. Then we have a weekly “Magazine Roundup” of international magazines from the German-speaking countries, as well as Eastern Europe, Latin America, the USA, India and Saudi Arabia. And we feature a semi-annual “Books this Season” with summaries of what critics are saying about the season’s most talked-about books. So if you’re a fan of the author Ingo Schulze,



*The chair of the session was Elina Moisio, who is a member of the City Council and City Board in Helsinki.*

say, and are interested to hear reactions to his latest book *Handy* after the success of his earlier *Simple Storys*, you'll get what you're looking for here.

And most importantly, we translate in full keynote articles on all aspects of culture, from the opera – with detailed reports from Bayreuth and Salzburg – to the theatre – here you'll find out what's new in the German "blood and sperm" theatre – to music, with interviews with conductor Christian Thielemann, and composers Wolfgang Rihm and Volker David Kirchner, for example, to literature, politics, society and social commentary, to science and humanities, and what's going on at CERN with the Large Hadron Collider.

Now a word about the authors. As I mentioned, the scope is wide, and resolutely international, featuring in addition a large number of authors from Eastern Europe. For example from Poland there is Adam Krzeminski and Adam Michnik, as well as Andrzej Stasiuk, Pawel Huelle and the young author Dorota Maslowska, who shot to fame recently with her *Polish-Russian War under a White-Red Flag*. From Ukraine there are the writers Oksana Sabuschko and Yuri Andruchovych, among others. From Hungary Imre Kertesz and Laszlo Földeny, from Russia the poet Olga Martynova, the philosopher Michail Rklin and the writer Viktor Erofejev.

Now all of this creates synergies: articles which went unnoticed in a broader European context – or were used to light fires – became widely disseminated after being published on our site. Some examples: On the eve of the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, Jürgen Habermas gave an interview to the DPA, the Deutsche Presse-Agentur. We picked it up and then it was noticed by *Repubblica*, who published it in Italian. A speech on Europe by Habermas that appeared in the *Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger* was published on signandsight.com, and then in *Le Monde*. We published an article on Arab intellectuals that then appeared in *El Pais*. An interview with Arno Brecker – "Hitler's favourite sculptor" – conducted in 1979 by André Müller – the absolute master of the provocative, unrelenting interview – was republished by *Harpers Magazine* in the US after we published it, as were parts of an interview with Thomas Bernhard that we had put online in full after excerpts were published in German in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Sontagszeitung*. The examples abound: other papers that have republished our stories include the Dutch *Trouw*, the Danish *Expressen*, and many more.

And as I mentioned earlier, we have also initiated debates of our own, such as recently on multiculturalism. This was a much talked-about forum of exchange with a range of European authors including Pascal Bruckner, Ian Buruma and Timothy Garton Ash, Paul Cliteur, Stuart Sim, Halleh Ghorashi, Lars Gustaffsson, Bassam Tibi and – his expert – Ayaan Hirsi Ali.

In his presentation this morning, Alexandre Mirlesse spoke of a dream he had, and I

will leave you with mine. I believe that using the English language and the Internet, we can create a European *Öffentlichkeit*, a true European public sphere. This is something signandsight.com and our sister site Perlentaucher are now working to bring about. To do it, we are hosting a conference in Amsterdam on May 11, entitled "Let's talk European!" with the editor-in-chief of the Hungarian paper *Magyar Narancs*, the deputy editor-in-chief of *Trouw* and Arne Ruth, the long time editor-in-chief of the Swedish daily *Dagens Nyheter*, as well as German journalists.

And on 15–16 June 2007 we will host the event "Towards a European public space – for a transnational newspaper and magazine network in Central Eastern Europe" with chief editors of all the region's major quality newspapers, the EU-commissioner Claus H. Sørensen and many other top-ranking speakers.

In his remarks yesterday, Finland's former prime minister and parliamentary speaker Paavo Lipponen said: "In the very distant future we may well have the Roman Empire back", demonstrating in passing the famous Finnish pragmatism. But let me ask you: wouldn't it be more appropriate at this juncture to put our pragmatism, and our energy, into forward-looking projects such as a pan-European signandsight.com?

Kiitos paljon!





## **Media and the Future of the European Integration – Developing a Truly European Forum**

*Susanne Mundschenk*, Co-founder of [www.eurointelligence.com](http://www.eurointelligence.com)

*Jean-Louis Arnaud*, Journalist, Novelist

*Reetta Meriläinen*, Editor-in-Chief, Helsingin Sanomat



The EU has made big steps towards a single European economy. While this process is far from complete, it is fair to say that the EU, and the euro area in particular, have achieved a high degree of economic integration. Yet, disseminating economic news and commentary remains predominantly national. Most newspapers present the news and analysis primarily from a domestic market viewpoint. Those with a special European edition (*Financial Times*, *Wall Street Journal Europe*), still provide full coverage of their domestic markets – the corporate sector, the financial sector, and all relevant political areas – while the coverage of other EU/euro area countries tends to be less detailed and less consistent.

Politicians and academics have tended to misjudge the response of the media industry to the economic integration of Europe. They assumed that as economic integration proceeds, the media would automatically follow. They thought that integration would not only create demand for more information, but, conversely, the establishment of pan-European media would help to foster the process of integration. This was not the case. Economic integration did neither raise demand for more information nor did the European papers help to foster the process of integration.

### **European integration – a challenge for the media**

Why is there no pan-European newspaper business? There are several answers to that. Production costs for a European newspaper are prohibitively high if it is to be printed and distributed in all EU countries. A multi-language newspaper would be even more expensive.

Compared to the national readership, the pan-European readership is very small. European issues are only a small fraction of our reality. This means that it is even harder for a European newspaper to survive economically. Finally the role of journalists as information providers has changed through the Internet. Newspapers no longer hold the monopoly over news and comment. In the Internet there is a growing community of academics, experts and activists that provide quasi instantaneous analysis of events in blogs and other news sites.

While the Internet is a challenge for the classical newspaper business, it also offers unprecedented opportunities in particular for a pan-European readership. The Internet



*Susanne Mundschenk*

enables communities to engage in a debate irrespective of where they live. No one gets rejected due to limits of space. No one has to wait until the next morning to know what is in the news. Switching languages is possible with just one click. For Europe, the Internet is the medium without alternative.

### **Building on a community**

We at [www.eurointelligence.com](http://www.eurointelligence.com) define ourselves as a community of people who share an interest in European economic integration. Our focus is on macro economics and politics of the euro area. We serve a community with many different stakeholders. There are international investors for whom the euro area is nothing but a single economy. There are economists with special interest in the euro area. There are also policy makers and central bankers, government officials, who are involved or interested in European economic affairs. Our objective is to re-engage these stakeholders and to build up this community.

One year after the launch of our website we already have 4000 visits per day. Our readers come predominantly from Europe but also from America and increasingly also from Asia.

Every morning our readers are briefed with daily news and analysis for the euro area.

We pick our stories out of 11 national or international newspapers as well as over 12 dedicated blogs and write together a narrative that is unique for the euro area. This four page long summary is available online or per email as an abbreviated version. In our comment section we also encourage our readers to engage in the debate by writing contributions for our website. Without debating culture there is no real community.

### Europe is more than the sum of its parts

Bringing the news for the euro area together gives a very different picture compared to reading the national news separately. It provides the euro area a face to look at.

The News briefing allows us to point out similarities or differences between countries and view points of commentators. You can learn how countries respond differently to fiscal pressures in real time. You can read commentators from France, Germany, UK or Italy disagreeing on the credit crisis, the ECB or fiscal policy. You can follow national elections and government building in other member countries, even in small ones. You can find out about expectations and fears of what the European Central Bank should or should not do. Our press review gives a flavour of where the discussion lines are.

We discuss national events from the perspective of the euro area. National newspapers set different emphases on news stories. This is because the national framework is often different from a European perspective. What is good for one country is not necessarily good for Europe. You may be interested to know what your country got out of the EU budget, but as long as there is no discussion about how the budget should be spend to serve best the EU there is no true European perspective. Another example is that member countries followed each other in abolishing or reducing inheritance tax out of fear that wealthy citizens are to move to more tax friendly countries. These are battles that lead nowhere.



*The chair of the session, Channel controller  
Riitta Pihlajamäki (TV1 YLE).*

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
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**EUROINTELLIGENCE DAILY NEWS BRIEFING**

**Is this the end of Europe's rate rising cycle?**

13.04.2007  
 Jean-Claude Trichet hints at another rate rise in June, but makes no further commitments; Bank of Spain warns banks about irrational exuberance; executive pay has become a hot political issue in France and the Netherlands; the German and Italian governments are under pressures to spend their growing tax revenues; Greece's monetary bubble is resistant to higher interest rates; Irish inflation rises to 2.9%; Nicolas Sarkozy, meanwhile, has been accused of being anti-German. [more]

**DAILY MARKET RATES**



**ECB WATCH**

**With the Euro at \$1.35 and ¥160, who needs higher interest rates?**

14.04.2007  
 By: Eurointelligence ECB Watch  
 European interest rates will go up to 4% in June, but the continued rise in the euro's exchange rate will put a lid on further interest rate increase. The current rate will peak at 4% in our view, contrary to market expectations. [more]

**Some thoughts on decoupling from a European perspective**

11.04.2007  
 By: Eurointelligence ECB Watch  
 ECB WATCH In its latest World Economic Outlook, the IMF has had an interesting article on whether the world can decouple from the US. What about the euro area? Trade is not an important factor, but this is more than compensated through the close financial market links. If there is financial stress in the US, there is no chance that Europe will decouple. [more]

**COMMENT AND ANALYSIS**

**There is a lot more optimism about the EU Constitution now**

09.04.2007  
 By: Wolfgang Munchau

**NEW DAILY MORNING BRIEFING**

Eurointelligence has launched a free Daily Morning Briefing of our latest content. Please follow this link.

**WOLFGANG MUNCHAU'S BLOG**

**Merkel's Coalition might collapse within a year**

11.04.2007  
 The SPD has powerful reasons to walk out of the Grand Coalition ahead of the 2009 elections. Tactically, they would be crazy not to.

**EMU MONITOR**

**Why the ECB is inconsistent**

04.04.2007  
 By: Patrick Minford, Cardiff University  
 Michael Woodford proclaimed that the ECB's money pillar is redundant and misleading. Patrick Minford explains why Woodford has a point.

*Www.eurointelligence.com is a pan-European website.*

**Outlook**

The title of this session is "the media and the future of European integration". We argued that there are good reasons for why the classic media cannot address a pan-European readership and foster European integration. Fortunately, the future of the media, the Internet, has a lot to offer for European integration. The Internet gives us news about countries that we would otherwise not know about. In the Internet people from different countries and backgrounds can meet and exchange their views. Learning to know others is the key to a European civil society. Our website addresses only a small fraction of this European identity, but it finally gives the euro, our currency, the identity it deserves.

I regret that I have to say from the very beginning that the French media does not develop in a European forum. And this is different from what it used to be some years ago. When I say some years ago, I mean 15 or 20 years ago – at the time when in France European issues, whether politic, monetary, economic, were the main French topics. But that was at a time when top executives, like Giscard d’Estaing and after him Francois Mitterand, had true personal vision of what Europe should be. And this is not the case at the moment.

Then what happened? Let me make a few points, two or three points. First point regarding the media itself, especially the television. But what is true for the television, is also regrettably true for the written press, the newspapers and the news magazines. And I have to point out that the press in France has become very conformist. I regret to say that. I’m a journalist and I’m under the impression that twenty years ago the press had more imagination, more the spirit of the scoop. The spirit of the scoop, which would be basically the spirit of the press. The scoop has disappeared. Nowadays when a journalist goes to his chief editor with a story that is original, he is usually not welcome. What interests the chief editor is what he finds, what he reads, what he hears in the other media, whether newspapers or television. And that altogether is very sad.

Now if we look at the politicians, the politicians in France, as far as European affairs are concerned, have turned to be very domestic and are using European issues as arguments for their own domestic policies. There is one, in my opinion regretful, example which is Laurent Fabius. Laurent Fabius was the former Prime Minister with Francois Mitterand, who was a true European, as president. If you look at Francois Mitterand’s policy, it is certain that he was a European, European-minded. And as you know Fabius opposed the last European treaty and campaigned for the “non” in the last referendum, which frankly one could not imagine from a former French Prime Minister. Why did he do that? You know as well as I do. Because he thought – he was wrong thank God – that it would help him to become the president of the republic. He thought that with this kind of attitude he would gather not only the anti-European, but also the semi-European, the sceptical votes. He thought that he would gather that part of the French left. And I would say that this kind of attitude obviously has marked the French policy for the last ten years.



*Jean-Louis Arnaud*

On the other hand, there are politicians like Jacques Chirac. Chirac is quite a politician, no doubt about that. But he has never been a convinced European, whatever he said, whatever he thought. Lionel Jospin was his Prime minister during the four years "gradation" period, which was very long and consequently very bad. Gradation in France is no good, nobody governs anymore. And Jospin was not a man very much interested in the European policy, as we all saw at the time of the congress and the Treaty of Nice. And when in France the top executive in the fifth republic is very important, and if at the level of the president of the republic there is no personal vision of Europe, there is no vision of Europe at all in the rest of France. I regret to state that, but I'm afraid it's true. And that combination of lack of vision at the very top and the conformism, as I call conformism, at the level of the press has made that what we see now; here is no European debate as such in France.

Of course, European issues are raised from time to time, but for example in the recent presidential debate Europe has not really played an important role. Of course that's sad. Politicians in the debates were very cautious about their European pronouncements. They have been fearing for quite some years that it could take away a part of their electors. I personally am not sure that they are right in that sort of vision. But it's a fact. And that is a cause for their precaution, for their timidity. Shyness, I would say, as far as Europe is concerned. Now, what will happen? We'll see that in three weeks time. Next Sunday they will vote and we will likely know who is the next French president. It is very uncertain at the moment, which makes things a bit more interesting



*Professor Matti Klinge, chair of the Finnish Committee Sinikka Salo and President of the French Council of Economic Analysis Christian de Boissieu are listening to the speakers.*

but also unpredictable as far as France's position in Europe is concerned. And I am not saying this because I'm French, but because I am convinced that if France has no say in European affairs, then there is not much of Europe. It has been so for fifty years and there are reasons for that. One of them is that it can be said, that it is still basically this Franco-German agreement which can push Europe further.



*Reetta Meriläinen*  
Editor-in-Chief, Helsingin Sanomat

Ladies and Gentleman, dear audience! First some apologies: I do apologize, that I was nasty enough to change the title we have a bit. My new title is: Future Media and the European Integration – Developing a truly European Forum. I know that organizers of seminars hate this kind of activism, but you know, you never can really trust a journalist. Secondly, I apologize for not giving answers but asking questions. That is the hard core of my profession.

But back to the point. First I started to think what a "Truly European Forum" could and should be. A Forum for Whom? For European politicians and business professionals or for European citizens? As director Mundschenk said, the pan-European newspaper readership is relatively small compared to the national readership. And from a journalist's point-of-view a pan-European audience doesn't really exist. At least yet. You don't know to whom you are writing when you are writing to an European reader.

The world around us has changed so dramatically that even the journalists – this is sarcasm – are interested in their readers: who they are, which kind of information is relevant to them, how high is the level of their knowledge on European matters. And at the far end: Are they interested in pan-European issues and topics at all?

I have been working in the newspaper business for 36 years and 11 years with our newspaper's online service.

I guess we all in this room recognize the problems and challenges of printed newspapers all over the world including Europe. The newspapers are now in the middle of one of the biggest and most dramatic changes. I think that the change in technology is the easiest part of that change. It is easier to handle than the changes in peoples minds, mind sets and behaviour. We have been talking much about the media convergence from the technical angle but there is also a tremendous customer, reader convergence going on. Readers do not only read their papers or watch TV, but hang around the Internet, listen to their iPods, participate in web chats – and often simultaneously.

And one of the big changes – not as strong yet in Europe as in the US – is the rising citizen journalism, activism. People don't want just to be readers, they also want to be journalists. They want to write, share information on the topics they feel are relevant, useful to them. And this may mean that the traditional journalism has partly failed to

offer relevant or interesting information or touch people emotionally. The traditional (and dearly loved) role of a journalist as a hohepriest or gatekeeper is a bit out of date, much more than that of a watchdog.

If we want to create a truly European Forum, we should let European people, the citizens to participate. Forum means a place for all. If we build a forum for politicians and business people only, it doesn't appeal, attract and invite European citizens, I can promise that. We have to let European citizens participate – to share their knowledge, their worries, their wishes, their dreams. The remaining big question is how?

I'm an optimist but I really cannot believe in a pan-European newspaper. It's too expensive, too risky and too much of a one way media. It's not the best forum for a dialogue.

A pan-European website is something to carefully think about. Could it be possible, could it function? Could it be attractive enough to be commercially sensible? The last question is not an easy one. There is money in Internet, but it is very difficult to find where. That question I willingly leave for business professionals to answer. Thank you very much for your attention. It was a pleasure to meet you.



*Jean-Louis Arnaud and Reetta Meriläinen were discussing the possibilities of a pan-European media.*







## **Challenges for the EU**

*Paula Lehtomäki*, Minister of the Environment and former Minister for European Affairs

*Christian de Boissieu*, President of the French Council of Economic Analysis

*Kersti Kaljulaid*, Member of the European Court of Auditors



*Paula Lehtomäki*

Minister of the Environment and former Minister for European Affairs

Ladies and Gentlemen, I would like to start by thanking Ms Sinikka Salo, the Chair of this Session and Chairperson of the Board of the Finnish National Committee of the European Cultural Foundation, for inviting me to address this distinguished audience.

As you probably are aware, the new Government of Finland was appointed yesterday and I have assumed the ministerial portfolio of the Minister of the Environment. However, I am happy to be able to share some of my thoughts about the challenges for the EU based on my experience as the Minister for European Affairs in the previous Finnish Government. After all, I will certainly be faced with many of these European challenges in my new ministerial role, as well. Climate change, for example, will obviously be high on my agenda.

Something that I am sure you have repeated many times at this seminar over these two days is that the European Union is now going through a period of time where efficient response to new kinds of issues is called for. Responding to these challenges was the starting point when planning Finnish EU Presidency agenda. The same issues also figure high on the current German Presidency agenda.

The fact that largely the same issues are highlighted by successive Presidencies might not be very interesting for the general public and media. However, from the point of view of continuity of the EU's work it is a positive, even necessary fact. Results require persistent work.

I would like to take up the following four challenges which need an efficient response from the Union and its Member States: Firstly, we need to succeed in global competition. Secondly, the EU needs to play an active role in combating climate change. Thirdly, we must further increase the coherence and efficiency of our external relations. And finally, we must try to increase our citizens' confidence in this European project.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Our welfare model is being called into question by global competition and ageing population. Europe faces increased competition and has not been able to make full use of its strengths. Despite increased economic growth, there are still more than 17

million unemployed within the EU, and productivity is modest in many fields. Ageing represents a major challenge not only to the development of working life and the labour market but to the social security system in general. What is called for is adaptation, opening up and investment in our strengths.

The economy of the EU countries is now closely interlinked which makes coordination of our economic policies crucial. At the Member State level, it is important to continue economic reforms also during better times. We need to convince our citizens that, by reforming public services and creating incentives to work, we can deliver better social care than without reforms.

We must also continue to develop the internal market, which is the real underlying competitive strength of the EU. Internal market provides European companies with a strong home market and also tough competition, which they need in order to thrive in global markets. The remaining hurdles of internal market should be removed so that we could make full use of our economic integration.

In order to turn the perceived threat of globalisation into an opportunity, the EU should especially promote innovation and create markets that are conducive to innovative activity. Action is urgently required on many fronts: level of R&D investment, reforming higher education, getting the fragmented patent system in order, developing standards etc. We have a long list of things to do.

In addition to the internal work, the openness of global economy is vital for the EU. It is important to restart the WTO negotiations in the coming weeks. Otherwise the chances of completing the Doha round will be greatly diminished. Furthermore, we have to further develop the different aspects of the EU's policy on external economic relations so that the Union's trade and economic policy truly contributes to the competitiveness of European business in third markets.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our times. I believe that the decisions taken by the European Council last month were truly historical. First of all, the Union set their own independent target of achieving a 20 percent reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 (compared to 1990 levels). And secondly, it announced its willingness to reduce emissions by 30 percent if a global agreement is reached.

This shows that the European Union is globally a leading force in taking action to promote environmental sustainability and, in particular, to combat climate change. At the same time, this poses many challenges in the near future.



*Paula Lehtomäki*

Firstly, we need a broad-based global agreement on climate change after 2012. Promoting such an agreement is a top priority for the Finnish Government. The EU must assume a leading role in the future international climate change negotiations. A regime that includes all developed countries as well as more developed developing countries is the only sustainable way to tackle the challenge of climate change as well as to secure the competitiveness of European industries.

Secondly, in the near future, the EU must agree on how to divide the EU's independent reduction target. Finland is committed to bearing a fair share of this target. However, we find it crucial that the Commission prepares its proposal on burden-sharing in close cooperation with the Member States. National circumstances (such as Northern location, share of energy intensive industries etc. in Finland's case) need to be fully recognised.

Ambitious targets have been set. Now it is time to find the political will to meet them. We should not see the climate challenge as a mere burden. It is an opportunity for the EU to become a low carbon community. How can we achieve this?

We need to very carefully analyse how to further develop the Emissions Trading Scheme in such a way that it provides an efficient tool for reducing emissions and at the same time secures competitiveness. We also need to look at other means, for

instance eco-innovations and use of economic instruments, such as fiscal policies. We must turn the perceived threat into an opportunity.

Energy is the main factor in climate change, accounting for some 80 percent of the EU's greenhouse gas emissions. Energy is a vital part of our daily lives in Europe and we are used to relying on it. But the days of secure and cheap energy are over and we are already facing the consequences of climate change. Moreover, the EU's increasing dependency on imported oil and gas not only threatens its security of supply, but it also means higher prices.

In order to ensure a sustainable, secure and competitive energy supply, a common European response is needed. A new European Energy Policy must be ambitious, effective and long-lasting – and involve everyone. The European Council last month committed itself to an Energy Action Plan, which helps the EU to achieve its energy goals. The plan consists of several clearly defined aims which will shift the EU towards a more sustainable, secure and competitive low-energy economy.

Our citizens expect a lot from us in responding to the challenges of climate change. We should count on their support in implementing the necessary measures. According to this spring's Euro barometer opinion survey, the majority of the EU citizens are very much concerned about climate change. More than eight out of ten people are well aware that the way they consume energy has a negative impact on climate. More than seven out of ten people feel that they will need to change their energy consumption habits and do their part in energy saving. This general European attitude to climate change is crucial if we are to succeed in our efforts to tackle this common challenge.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Our unity within the EU has more value than the sum of our particular interests. The Union is best listened to and most respected in the global setting, when it has a clear and common message to give out. I believe in this even stronger after my own expe-



*British Ambassador to Finland, Dr Valerie Caton is taking part in the discussion about the future of the EU.*

rience during Finnish EU Presidency.

The future of the Constitutional Treaty has been discussed all along this spring. The Treaty contains crucial improvements for EU's external action. We fully support the Presidency's efforts to have the Treaty in force by the European Parliament elections in 2009.

Alongside the Treaty process we should take work forward in enhancing, by concrete steps, our external policies. As mandated by the June 2006 European Council, the Finnish Presidency made concrete progress. The December European Council invited us to take this work forward. June 2007 European Council conclusions could provide further guidance to increase the efficiency, coherence and visibility of EU external policies.

Thanks to our common policies we are already a strong actor in many of the fields I have mentioned earlier: The EU is a constructive partner in trade policy and in the World Trade Organization. Our responses to the threats of climate change also prove our ability of acting in concert. We should use our common instruments to act in a similar way in other areas of external relations, as well. We must be able to match the coherence of our action with that of our global partners and competitors. And create partnerships and joint leadership with like-minded countries where possible or needed.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Although the EU is delivering to its citizens, the credibility and legitimacy of the Union is questioned on many fronts and in different corners of our continent. This goes for my own country, Finland, as well. We should not deny this.

I believe that the best way to increase public confidence in the Union is to achieve concrete results, to deliver more and better, for example in responding to the challenges that I have just mentioned. The words "concrete results" are nowadays used very often, perhaps too often. But I take the view that visible results, results that affect the lives of our citizens, are the best evidence of the EU functioning properly and producing added value.

From this perspective, as well, we must conclude the Treaty reform process by the end of 2009. Continued uncertainty on the Union's future framework would undermine our credibility.

During the last fifteen years we have had a treaty reform process underway most of the time. Reforms have been necessary, but these processes are perhaps not of great interest to our citizens. We should now aim at a Treaty that serves us for many years to come and gives the Union necessary instruments for efficient and coherent action. Then we can concentrate all our efforts on delivery and on responding to the key challenges ahead of us for the benefit of our citizens.



Thank you very much Sinikka, Ladies and Gentlemen. I'm very glad to be with you just two days before our presidential election in France. I will not talk about this topic: only if I'm obliged to do so when I say a few words about the institutional debate. Without any kind of co-ordination with the minister, I also have four parts that I will discuss in a reverse order. Because I want to start with confidence.

The four things I want to deal with are the following. First I say a few words about confidence and growth, because I think that it is a very important topic for us in Europe, if we want to rebuild confidence. The second part of my presentation is to say that we have to combine what I would call a top-down approach with a bottom-up approach. We do not have to choose between bottom-up and top-down, we have to do both. I will be more specific concerning the combination of the two approaches. The third point will relate to the economic governance of the euro zone. I will finish with the fourth point, by saying a few words about the political governance of Europe.

May I say that I'm talking for myself, and not on behalf of the current French government or the one that is going to be elected soon.

First point: confidence and growth. The minister already talked about R&D, innovation, completing the single market and increasing confidence in Europe for the citizens and for the public opinion. Europe has to deliver more growth and more employment. This is not a French problem: this is a more general problem. I'm not talking about the UK. I'm talking about countries that have had a rather poor record over the years.

I think that the main topic here has nothing to do with what I would call demand policy in the Keynesian sense of the word. It has to do with supply side economics, and medium and long term perspectives. We have to take measures in order to boost our potential growth and try not only to increase our potential growth but also to lift and to improve our actual growth. If you look at the data, potential growth for the euro zone is estimated just around two percent per year. Between 2 and 2.25 percent. As opposed to the US, where potential growth is estimated to be around 3 percent. If you want to understand this gap, you must take into account demographic factors. I will not talk about these issues; but I will mention that ageing population is also true in the US and not only in Europe.

But we also have to take into account important aspects such as investment in general and investment in new technologies, R&D, education in particular. Namely, all the topics that have been listed by and in the Lisbon agenda in 2000. If you think about Lisbon seven years after, I would say that the heads of state and government were, in fact, very insightful.

It was a very good intuition to say in 2000 that Europe must be a model as regards knowledge economy, growth, employment, education, training, etc. But what is an aspect of a lack of European credibility, is that in regard to the Lisbon agenda, Europe has not delivered at all. This is not my own personal interpretation, it is a statement made by the Wim Kok report two years ago. All the reports on Lisbon are converging to the conclusion that we are nowhere about Lisbon. And we are nowhere despite the fact that the items of Lisbon were and are the relevant items. They are related to supply side considerations, R&D, innovation, etc. We must try to catch up with the US in a situation where regarding education and technology the Chinese and the Indians are catching up vis-à-vis us very quickly.

As Europeans we are in a kind of a sandwich, if I may use this image, between the US and the big emerging countries and I think that we are not delivering enough. I have no time to continue on this very important subject, which has to do with the way to implement Lisbon in the EU member countries. When you come to the Lisbon agenda, you always raise the financing problem. Mr Blair – I remember when the UK was chairing the EU – was posing to us, especially the French, a kind of dilemma by saying that we have to choose between financing Lisbon and financing the Common Agricultural Policy.

May I say that even if we have to improve and reform the CAP, I think that we must do both. That is, at the same time that we are reforming and perhaps reducing the costs of the CAP, we have to do more for the Lisbon items. For me the financing of Lisbon strategy has mainly to do with national decisions according to the subsidiary principle. But I guess that something has to be done also at the European level. I am not talking about the EU budget here, because we always come to a big controversy. I'm talking about appealing to the European Investment Bank as a way to perhaps finance a part of the "iceberg" of the Lisbon agenda.

In Europe, we have a lot of savings. The problem that we are facing is due to the fact that our savings are not well allocated. They are not sufficiently invested in private equity, they are not sufficiently allocated to the financing of investment in new technologies. If you look at the data, the EIB is raising about 60 billion euros per year on capital markets. Why not raise it 80 instead of 60? That gives 20 billion euros more. Let us say that those 20 billion euros are going to play as levers in order to induce the countries to start financing the Lisbon objectives and agenda. I think that we have to



*Christian de Boissieu*

do something here and not be prisoners of the debate on the EU budget.

Now I come to my second topic. We have to combine a top-down approach with a bottom-up approach. Top-down is the debate about institutions and constitution. After the French and the Dutch 'no's I think that we have to find a way to rebound. May I say that I'm somewhat fascinated by the way Ms Merkel has approached the issue since the start of this year. At the same time the debate about a streamlined or simplified Treaty is not very clear. What I know is that it will be difficult to re-organise a referendum, at least in France and I think in the Netherlands also. We have to change and we have to simplify. We in France, and perhaps also in the Netherlands, have to pass it through the Parliament and not have a referendum. If you look at what the main candidates were telling during the campaign, Mr Sarkozy was saying: "I want the simplified treaty to be ratified by the French Parliament". Ms Royal and Mr Bayrou were saying that they both wanted a referendum, a popular votation of the new text.

Whatever the solution, even if the new text is shorter, which will not be difficult by the way, I think that it will have to make some important breaks, important changes for instance concerning the rules of decision, the debate whether we could pass from unanimity to a qualified majority for some major issues. For me this is a very important debate. Because at 27 and perhaps even 30 countries in a few years from now, by definition, the unanimity rule means that we cannot decide on anything significant.



*Audience at the House of the Estates (Säätytalo).*

The debate about the bottom-up approach has to do for example with the discussion about energy and CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. I think that one way to reconcile the citizens with Europe, one way to interest the European in the concept of Europe is to give the impression and the certainty that Europe is concrete. It is not only abstract.

A field where we could demonstrate that Europe is concrete, for me, has to do with what we discussed before. That is energy, CO<sub>2</sub>, the fight against the climate change, and things like this. I tell you just for your information that I was in charge of a report on this topic for the French government. Mr Chirac said a few years ago that France must divide its CO<sub>2</sub> emissions by four by 2050 and I was in charge during one year of a Commission that asked not why but how: how to get there? If you look at the sectors: transportation, housing, industry, agriculture, how to set targets for them in order to divide by four those emissions by 2050? On this topic, energy and environment, Europe is not for once organised around the Franco-German axis. It is much more open.

When I was writing my report, which was released two months before the Stern report in the UK, I went to London to see Nick Stern, and we discussed our respective reports. I had the feeling that there was at least at that time, and perhaps today too, more convergence between the UK and France than between Germany and France on the issue of energy and environment. Perhaps this has to do with the fact that Germany is still not fully clear about what to do with nuclear energy, which is one important

aspect of the topic. I mention this for the reason that I was glad to hear that Finland is very active in this field. Therefore it might not be a couple after all, but perhaps a triangle which could be very active in order to foster progress in this field: a triangle between Finland, the UK and France. To finish with this topic, there is a question that I wanted to ask the minister.

I was glad with the March 2007 Council and with the package of the Commission, which was published before. So now we have to deliver. If we cannot make progress with 27 countries, will it be necessary to have in mind the possibility of a scenario of a strengthened cooperation with a sub-group of countries? For me this is a very important topic, because I know that the Treaty is not fully clear about the fields where we could use these levers and scenarios.

But I guess that on many aspects of the energy and environment policy it will be difficult to make significant progress with 27 countries. If we are bound to the unanimity, what to do? Will we die with the unanimity rule? Will we prefer to live by removing, one way or another, the unanimity rule? For me this is a very concrete problem that we are going to face, because we took the necessary steps within the European Council, but those steps are necessary but not sufficient.

A third point: a few words about the economic governance of Europe and especially the euro zone. I have no time to come to specific debates. May I say that during the last months the ECB has been attacked in France, and I think that this was not very fruitful. I am not in favour of debating the independence of the ECB or changing its mandate. I am in favour of keeping the mandate of the ECB as it is defined by the Maastricht Treaty (article 105) but I think that the ECB could be more pragmatic with its current mandate.

The Maastricht Treaty is compatible with several interpretations of this mandate. How do you define price stability? What is the main objective as opposed to an exclusive objective regarding price stability? For me the ECB has to be more pragmatic and more transparent. The main debate is about accountability.

As an economist I would say – I don't know whether Sinikka Salo would agree with me – that monetary policy is not less efficient because it is more democratic, because it is more transparent. I know that when you talk to Mr Trichet about this, he always answers that they organize press conferences and they are talking to the European Parliament, to the national Parliaments etc. This is fine, but they could go further. For instance, since the start, I was in favour of publishing the minutes of the board of governors of the ECB like in England or like in the US. I was never fascinated by the counter arguments opposed to the publication of the minutes of the ECB.

Today the Eurogroup could deal with all topics but decides nothing. The decisions

are taken by the ECOFIN Council. I think that if we adopt the simplified Treaty, this treaty must give a real decision-making power to the Eurogroup as such. This gap, the fact that you could deal with all topics and decide nothing, presents a credibility problem for the Eurogroup as such, despite the fact that the Chairman of the Eurogroup Mr Juncker has been appointed for two years and renewed recently. Regarding the growth and stability pact, I feel better with the new version but I have no time to come back to this topic.

As regards the controversial topic of tax harmonisation, I just want to say that we do not have to converge to the same rate, but I think it would be important for the credibility of Europe as such to try to converge to the same tax basis, for corporate tax for instance. There are such big differences as regards the definition of corporate tax and I am not talking about the rate. I am just talking about the tax basis. Whether we are in the position to succeed or not in agreeing on the tax basis definition for the corporate tax is going to be a crucial political test. There are some other topics concerning the policy mix in the euro zone. Since the start of the euro, the game between monetary policy and fiscal policies has not been very cooperative. We have had a sort of diffidence between the ECB and some governments.

Whenever you have a problem in a couple, generally it is due to the two persons. I think that each of the partners has a responsibility for this non-cooperative game which has characterized the policy mix in the euro zone since 1999. Some governments have been reluctant to reduce the public sector deficits and the public debt. Conversely the ECB has not been pragmatic enough in 2002–2003 and I think that even today the ECB is not sufficiently pragmatic.

As an economist, I don't see the risk of inflation in the current world. Inflation today is on asset markets, real estate, financial markets. Inflation is not in CPI (Consumer Price Index) despite the energy shock and the food shock. Therefore, I think that there is a debate about the diagnosis. With the current level of the euro, it is rather dangerous to send a signal to the market that we are expecting at least one, perhaps two, new raises of rates by the ECB in the months to come. Europe is taking most of the adjustment due to the falling dollar, the Japanese are playing the game of the weak yen, the Chinese do not want to revalue the yuan significantly. Therefore, the pound and the euro are taking most of the adjustment of the falling dollar. We do not have to change the mandate of ECB to validate this remark and perhaps to come to a more pragmatic monetary policy.

Some words about the political governance of Europe. We were aware of the fact that there was some inconsistency between enlargement and the unanimity rule. This inconsistency is at the core of the structural changes that we have to face. Now enlargement is there. And from a certain point-of-view I think it is a good thing. We have also

to enlarge, if I could say so, the field of the qualified majority. The problem that we are facing is that we need unanimity to remove the unanimity rule. This is a vicious circle, in which we are. I'm not sure that we will get this unanimous voting. But I'm sure that if we continue to enlarge Europe without removing the unanimity, Europe is going to be totally blocked. We will decide on nothing in a world that is changing.

Another scenario is the possibility of a multi-speed Europe as a way to cope with enlarged Europe. Perhaps this is going to be very likely. I think this is not the best scenario for Europe, but perhaps the second or third best. If we implement a multi-speed Europe, we will have to manage a very complicated system.

Because the criteria to define the multi-speed Europe are multi-fold, and they are not leading to the same border. Schengen is one division of Europe. The euro is another one which leads to another geographic partition of Europe. Defence: another partition. How will we manage these multi-multi-speed Europes? We will get a fragmentation of Europe depending on the field we are talking about. This scenario leads to a very complicated governance challenge. It means that perhaps we will have to do something to avoid this scenario and to enlarge the validity of the qualified majority rule as it is set in the draft simplified Treaty or even beyond. The new Treaty to be ratified by EU members in the course of 2008 gives a promising but partial answer to this big challenge.



## Challenges for (those new in) the EU

The only Europe we – Estonians – know inside out, is the Europe which has to regenerate itself. From 2004, this has been the common theme: Europe has to recreate itself inside the Europe we currently know. At the same time it has to create and develop new European values. The latter is advancing; there are those both within and outside of Europe that believe that Europe should give up all ambitions of a deeper union and go for what it does really well – expand.

For people in the new Member States, the part of regenerating Europe is also very personal. We have had to re-find the Europe inside us, inside our heads, and undo our previous collective thinking. Being European is something which came naturally to Lennart Meri, the brave frontrunner of Estonians on our journey back to the true Europe. Us mortals have to work at it on a daily basis, to quickly feel included and involved. We need a systematic approach for beginners. To find – by observation and participation – some common, unifying European principles. They have to be relevant, effective, few in number and widely accepted. I am an accountant by profession. Paraphrasing the best known principles in the accounting profession I would like to call them the Generally Accepted European Principles.

First, it is maybe valuable to talk about the European principles which create admiration and respect for every newcomer. Europe, of course, is an agreement between nations, an agreement to protect European national diversity. Europe, the agreement of nations, works towards minimising the restrictions between different members of different nations allowing them to identify themselves in other ways than through their country of origin. The borderless nature of Europe creates far bigger possibilities for numerous different layers of civil society. Local communities – people unified by their values or hobbies – have a common grand playground and in order to belong, people have more possibilities to find their identity from a much bigger number of different possible identities. The first – and the most admirable – European principle is therefore: common Europe amplifies individual and group development potential. Everybody belongs to different groups at the same time while being part of the common network – European civil society.



*Kersti Kaljulaid*

Common identities can be sought across borders, across nations and across social groups. This civil society is protected and promoted by the EU through its four basic freedoms. A particularly good aspect of this principle is that many current challenges are best faced by the voluntary – rather than forced – cooperation and action of people from their free will. Economic development depends on international cooperation between academic players. Cleaner environment and more sustainable consumer habits arrive only via the co-ordinated action of environmentally sensitive groups. This first European principle applies both for macro level of expansion – i.e. adding new member states – and for the micro level expansion, through immigration. Neither nationality nor the country of origin principle represents sufficient glue to keep 21st century society together. One needs to belong to several different overlapping groups to feel that belonging.

What other common European principles might be taken from the perspective of a newcomer? There are several examples, but maybe the most common and for some reason sometimes not recognised by old Europe is the principle that every member state of EU is in the middle of Europe. There is no such thing as being on the outskirts of Europe. Not in geographical sense, not in the political sense. It is of course reality that sometimes states position themselves less than enthusiastically towards some

general processes. Let's take the euro as the simplest example. Those outside the euro area are not, and cannot be considered, any less interested in common EU economics in other issues. They might be outside because their people chose so or because their economies are at an unsuitable state of their development to join the euro area, manifested by their inability to converge with the entry criteria. But these outsiders are very much insiders – for example, by having ratified the European Constitutional Agreement. Or by supporting fewer barriers to financial markets. Or by being supportive to free movement of people. Each member state is inside the gravitational centre in some issues and outside in others.

This is a traditional – and obvious – European principle. No member state can be considered moving at different speed towards closer cooperation because they accelerate in different areas or at different times. Trying to discover a logical, mathematical, gravitational centre of Europe, or group of countries moving faster than others, to nominate them as speedier players in this common game is therefore pointless. So, it seems that there exists a common European principle of one speed. The acceleration time and methods can differ, but overall the speed is the same. This raises an interesting question – is this speed rapid enough? Is it faster than anybody motoring ahead under their own individual speed? Is the outside world changing slowly enough to allow Europe to halt?

The third important principle of Europe is difficult for the newcomer to learn to live



*Christian de Boissieu and Kersti Kaljulaid are discussing and Ms Sinikka Salo is chairing the session.*

with. It is the principle that Europe is indeed not ready. Not ready for today and even less ready for the future. It is, in lots of issues, coming to terms with the situation of 10 years ago, rather than ready to face current risks and opportunities. Every newcomer feels critical about this principle at first, before developing a sense of understanding, but not necessarily acceptance. After all, many seemingly straightforward issues have taken 20 years to agree. This principle of course places the miracle of enlargement into perspective. According to European timeframes, it was executed swiftly. But remaking Europe around Europe is therefore an example which does not repeat itself always as rapidly inside Europe. This lesson is the hardest to accept and the hardest to live with. And maybe slight unacceptance, if it is positive, is even a good thing. After all, most CEE countries have shown their support for the Constitution and its easier development framework and better adaptation to current and future issues.

So, three principles: Europe is an agreement between nations to create a borderless society, where cooperation is typically based on more numerous points of interest than nationality or country of origin. Secondly, Europe moves ahead with single speed. Different catalysts for movement and slightly different speed for different issues cannot mean a general two-speed or two-tier Europe. And thirdly, this speed – the single speed – needs to be higher. For that, more trust needs to be shown towards general European opinion. Therefore, trust in Europe is the key. Can we see it among those new to Europe and those who founded the Union or joined sometime between?

The answer for an observer seems to be no. For some reason, Europe which has worked for at least two decades to include issues nearer to people in its agenda – consumer protection, fight against home violence, educational promotion, fight with early school leaving – has seen constant loss of trust from people over Europe.

Maybe this ideological expansion – contrary to geographical expansion – has just not been right. Maybe Europe, which is wasting time on issues which most of people do not see as cross-border issues or where most people cannot pinpoint the connection between unfair competition, is just not trustworthy? Maybe the Union should start to not just sell the subsidiarity principle but also to follow it. Maybe then people would feel that the European Union actually has time and resources for the big issues where it can make a real difference. Maybe the problem is just that people cannot trust a common defence and common foreign policy to Europe which, at the same time, assumes the responsibility of paying every student studying abroad 140 euros per month at a cost higher than the amount of the actual support.

Just as most people do not expect their local social security board to be able to solve international issues like the peace in the Balkans, perhaps Europe, by assuming the roles and responsibilities of a nanny state, undermines the trust in its core activities?

Therefore maybe the way forward is in this sense the way back. It could be that it is not only the issue of how the citizens feel but also have something to do with the hard reality – if you have to manage a high number of rather tiny initiatives it is easy to lose sight of the bigger issues that need tackling. I am not mentioning the Common Agricultural Policy as a culprit. At least, member states have delegated their own agricultural support systems to the EU and do not therefore have parallel policies and financing through their national budgets. I do not question issues which have to be arranged together to guarantee equal economic playground. I do not target issues which clearly have to be fought together like immigration management. But the European Union is not designed to operate in all areas of a normal public sector.

We are in the situation where the next financial framework starts to be discussed. Officials are digging out analysis like Sapir report from the Prodi era, dusting it down and reading the still-valid message: our Europe does not have free hands to deal with Europe-wide issues. Its hands are tied by non-respect of the subsidiarity principle. This situation needs to be overcome. Politics must strive to free our Europe for global thinking and global playing.

National governments manage, depending on national style, 31 to 60 percent of GDP: Therefore, they have the ability – and the resources – to be active and supportive of citizens in many areas of everyday life. European communities do not have that. The signal – prioritise and concentrate, not expand – has been there every time the financial perspective or framework has been negotiated – MSs have refused to lift the budget ceiling much above one percent of overall GDP. This signal cannot be ignored. People want Europe to be relevant, up-to-date, ideally forward looking, and a significant and respected international player. That is what is expected of Europe, and that is where Europe must arrive. But the current burden on the Union is too heavy to run fast. As a hopeful new European I hope it will change. At one speed we move forward to bigger international and environmental security and economic prosperity, and that has to be the speed higher than anyone can separately manage. It is not enough to be simply together, as indicated by our slogan of the 50 years of Europe. It is time to release and realise the synergies from this togetherness.



## Speakers of the seminar

### Umayya Abu-Hanna

Umayya Abu-Hanna is a TV-journalist, columnist and writer and is Head of the Department of Audiovisual Journalism at the Helsinki Polytechnic. She is currently the Cultural Diversity Coordinator of the Finnish National Gallery's Research Department and member of the Arts Council of Finland. She is also a columnist of *Helsingin Sanomat*. Her new book on identity was published Fall 2007. Ms Abu-Hanna is of Palestinian origin; born in Israel in 1961 and has been living in Finland since 1981.

### Jean-Louis Arnaud

Jean-Louis Arnaud is French journalist specialized in politics and European issues. He has worked as a consultant for the research institute Notre Europe, a think tank founded by Jacques Delors. Along with other studies and books Mr Arnaud has also co-written the biography of Jacques Delors called *Mémoires*.

### Christoph Bertram

The former director of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin, a research center which advises the German government and parliament. During his long career Christoph Bertram has specialized in foreign politics and worked for various magazines including *die Zeit* and the *Foreign Policy Magazine* in Washington, D.C.

### Christian de Boissieu

French economist who has made long career as a researcher and teacher as well as in the French Council of Economic Analysis, as its president since 2003. In his published works he has specialized in monetary and financial questions as well in economic analysis. Christian de Boissieu is currently professor in the College of Europe in Bruges and in the University of Paris, Panthéon-Sorbonne.

### Agnes Heller

Agnes Heller was born in Hungary 1929 and has held the position of Hannah Arendt Professor of Philosophy in the Graduate Studies Program in the New School for Social Research in New York City since 1986. Agnes Heller currently researches and writes prolifically on ethics, Shakespeare, aesthetics, political theory, modernity, and the role of Central Europe in historical events.

### Leszek Jesień

Leszek Jesień is an expert and researcher on the European integration process, who has also worked as an adviser in EU related affairs to the prime minister of Poland. He currently holds a Chair of European integration in the Tischner European University in Kraków and is the Head of the EU section in the Polish Institute of International Affairs. He has recently published an analysis of the enlargement of the European Union.

### Kersti Kaljulaid

Kersti Kaljulaid was born in Estonia and has made her career in Estonian economics as well as in politics as a financial advisor to the prime minister. She is also a specialist on

international monetary organizations and has been working for EU organisations from the year 2004. Currently she is also a Member of the European Court of Auditors.

### **John Lambert**

Journalist currently working for the web magazine [www.signandsight.com](http://www.signandsight.com). John Lambert was born in Ottawa in 1960 and grew up in Vancouver. He studied Asian studies and philosophy and has worked as journalist, actor, literary translator and ski instructor. Before coming to *signandsight* he taught the history of philosophy and worked as translation editor on the English edition project of *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*.

### **Paula Lehtomäki**

Paula Lehtomäki was a Minister responsible for External Trade, Development Cooperation and European Affairs in Matti Vanhanen's first Government (2003–2007). On 19 April 2007 she was appointed Minister of the Environment. Ms Lehtomäki has been a member of the Finnish Parliament since 1999 and a Deputy Party Leader of the Centre Party (Keskusta) since 2002.

### **Paavo Lipponen**

The grand old man of the Social Democratic party in Finland, known for his interest in European politics. He was Prime Minister of Finland from 1995 to 2003, and Chairman of the Finnish Social Democratic Party from 1993 to 2005. Paavo Lipponen also served as Speaker of the Parliament of Finland 2003–2007.

### **Reetta Meriläinen**

Editor-in-chief of *Helsingin Sanomat*, which is one of the leading Scandinavian newspapers. Reetta Meriläinen has worked as a leader of the Sanoma School of Journalism since 1989. She also writes one of the most popular blogs in Finland.

### **Alexandre Mirlesse**

Associate researcher at Notre Europe. Alexandre Mirlesse was Researcher in literature at the École Normale Supérieure in Paris and joined Notre Europe in June 2006. He has contributed to the team's research on federalism and European identity. In 2007, he set out for a six-month trip across Europe, during which he has produced for Notre Europe a series of interviews of intellectual and artistic personalities of all backgrounds. These interviews are downloadable on *Notre Europe's* website ([www.notre-europe.eu](http://www.notre-europe.eu)) in the *Rencontres Européennes* section.

### **Susanne Mundschenk**

Co-founder and director of Eurointelligence ([www.eurointelligence.com](http://www.eurointelligence.com)). Susanne Mundschenk was a research fellow at the Center for European Integration Studies at the University of Bonn and a visiting scholar to the European Institute of the London School of Economics. She started her career in Paris at the Association for the Monetary Union of Europe, a think tank and lobby group for the single currency.

### **Nicola Mullenger**

Nicola Mullenger has a background in creative industries, regeneration, education, culture and diversity issues. She has previously worked in the Netherlands in visual arts event production; in London, managing a publicly funded information and training service for the creative industries; in New York and London galleries, co-curating artists working with photography. Nicola Mullenger published a book entitled *Youth prostitution in the new Europe: the growth in sex work* in 2000. Now she is employed by the LabforCulture centre on financial planning and reporting, communication, policy development and logistics.

### **Hans von Ploetz**

German diplomat and former Secretary of state in German Ministry for Foreign Affairs. He retired from the Foreign Service in 2005. Hans von Ploetz has served as a vice consul in Finland and an ambassador to Russia, United Kingdom and other countries, and lived all around Europe. His particular interests lie in security politics and European issues, on which he has written several articles.

### **Pedro Sorela**

The son of a Spaniard and a Colombian, Pedro Sorela has lived in various places, mostly in Europe. He is a former journalist of the Madrid newspaper *El País*. Now he writes novels, short stories and essays. His latest novel is *Ya verás (You will see)*, and he has recently published an essay on Borges, Shakespeare and other inventors of modern writing. He teaches writing in the University Complutense of Madrid.

### **Jean-Jacques Subrenat**

French diplomat who served as the ambassador to the WEU in Brussels (1995–1998), to Estonia (1998–2002) and to Finland (2002–2005). Jean-Jacques Subrenat has retired from the diplomatic service, and is now a Consultant. His special interests lie in the fields of international relations, European Union, Asia, defence and security, social trends. He is currently the Chairman of the Advisory board of the Institut Pierre Werner in Luxembourg and he is also engaged in teaching (at École nationale d'administration, Strasbourg), and is a member of IFRI (Institut français des relations internationales, Paris).

## **Chairmen of the seminar sessions**

### **Jaakko Iloniemi**

Finnish politician and diplomat, who has also made a noteworthy career in the field of economics. Mr Iloniemi has also worked as executive director in the Crisis Management Initiative. Nowadays he is frequently asked for comments on Finnish foreign policy and he has a weekly column in *Suomen Kuvalehti*. Jaakko Iloniemi is a Member of the Board of the European Cultural Foundation Network Finland.

**Elina Moisio**

Special Advisor for the Minister of Labour and a member of the City Council and City Board in Helsinki. Elina Moisio is active in the Green Party and is also a deputy member of the Board of the European Cultural Foundation Network Finland since 2007.

**Riitta Pihlajamäki**

Riitta Pihlajamäki is channel controller in the Finnish broadcasting company, YLE. From 1998 to 2005 she worked as the Head of Factual Programmes in YLE. During her long career as foreign correspondent and producer of international programmes, she has specialized in French and German politics and her particular interests lie in European Security politics. Ms Pihlajamäki is also a deputy member of the Board at the European Cultural Foundation Network Finland since 2008.

**Sinikka Salo**

Dr. Sinikka Salo is Member of the Board of the Bank of Finland. Her career as an economist and researcher includes working for the European Central Bank and the European Monetary Institute. She has been a member of the EU Economic and Financial Committee and is currently a member of the International relations Committee of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). Sinikka Salo has several honorary positions, e.g. chairman of the Board of the European Cultural Foundation Network Finland and member of the Helsinki University Senate.

**Working group of the seminar, European Cultural Foundation Network Finland**

**Hilkka Hytönen**, Planning secretary, City of Helsinki

**Laura Kolbe**, Professor, University of Helsinki

**Paavo Löppönen**, Director, Academy of Finland

**Elina Moisio**, Special Advisor, Ministry of Employment and the Economy

**Sinikka Salo**, Member of the Board, Bank of Finland

**Sari Aalto**, Secretary of the European Cultural Foundation Network Finland

**Jasmin Etelämäki**, Project secretary of the seminar "The Idea of Europe: Continuity and Change"



